The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XVI | New York Saturday, August 31, 1918 | Number 200

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FOCH'S offensive power offers as yet no indication of abating. Although the enemy is actually engaged on a longer front than has remained continuously active in any other of the great battles in the west, there remain great masses of British troops to the north and American troops to the east that are waiting for the command to attack. The Germans have lost much ground, a matter by no means so negligible to them as their newspapers pretend to believe. If the Allies keep on gaining ground they may presently menace the Lorraine iron districts as seriously as the Germans ever menaced Paris. And a menace to Lorraine, from which Germany secures three fourths of her ore supplies, would give the German nation a bitter foretaste of defeat. But what Foch is chiefly accomplishing is the wearing down of German man power. In the grim exchange of prisoners for prisoners, of lives for lives, the balance runs against the Germans. In an operation of such huge proportions the initial gains the defensive enjoys in selected positions are overbalanced by the losses inevitably attending retreat. Until the Germans find themselves in positions they can actually hold, every week will reduce their strength more rapidly than it reduces the strength of their foes. Even apart from the steady accretion of American troops, the Allied preponderance in man power grows more pronounced.

FROM such considerations it is not, however, to be inferred that this is likely to be the decisive battle which will bring Germany to her knees. As the German army recedes, it approaches the system of communications prepared in three years of fighting behind the Hindenburg line, while the Allied armies will have to improvise new roads through a wide stretch of territory devastated by war. This is a condition which makes for a greater mobility of German reserves. It also increases the possibility of massing artillery, upon which German fighting efficiency has been largely dependent. The Germans have lost many guns and much of their reserve stock of shells has been used up or destroyed, but it would be an over-optimistic view that they do not retain enough guns and shells to defend themselves well when once they have made their way back to tenable positions. It is therefore safest to assume that in the course of the next two months' fighting the armies will find themselves deadlocked, to await the time when America has in the field a great part of the eighty divisions assured by the pending man power bill. The final act will then begin. The Germans cannot stand against the armies of our Allies, augmented by an American army hardly inferior in strength to all the forces Germany will then have at her disposal.

ONE thing is plain enough from the news about Spain and Germany. Spain is quite willing to risk a break with Germany by adopting the policy of seizing one German ship in Spanish ports for every Spanish ship sunk by submarines. She is more than willing. She is courting a break with Germany. In other neutral countries signs of the

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same change of mind are appearing. The Dutch newspapers are commenting with a new frankness, unfavorable to Germany, upon her recent military performance and present military situation. Swiss papers written in German and hitherto pro-German in tone are reported as printing anti-German articles. Sweden, recognizing the Allied blockade in effect, is shutting down on trade with Germany, increasing her trade with the Allies, turning over to the Allies four hundred thousand tons of shipping. In other words, German stock is going down in Spain and in three of the countries nearest her and in a favorable position for estimating what is happening to her.

AMERICANS, as well as Russians, must feel very uncertain as to the exact nature of our relations with Russia. Is it peace or war? For a little time this uncertainty seemed to be cleared up by press reports, stating that the Soviet government had declared war on America. But these reports have neither been confirmed nor denied; how they arose can only be conjectured. Somewhere around August 2nd Chicherin appears to have informed our consul at Moscow that our landing at Vladivostok and Archangel was war; this was mere rhetoric, but may have been confused with diplomacy. We should admit ourselves that it was an act of war if there were such differences between Russia and America as nations are ready to fight about. There are no such differences, and if the Soviet government is patient, it need take no great harm from the temporary occupation of the few inhabited points in the frozen north or the remote Pacific. Such occupation is irregular, but so also is the Soviet government irregular. If the Bolsheviki had taken their chances with the Constituent Assembly, America could not possibly have acceded to the proposal to occupy Russian soil. Were a constituent assembly convened even at this late day, the United States would have no choice except to recognize the government it created and respect its formal sovereignty.

THE Allied governments can not permit the Czecho-Slovak forces in Russia to fall victims to the armed attack of German and Austrian prisoners. But is it actually true that the Czecho-Slovaks are in any such danger? Chicherin denies it, according to a communication that has reached the American press by the unnecessarily circuitous route of Moscow, Stockholm, Berlin and Amsterdam. The communication contains the further challenge: "Should, however, the grounds of this attack on the Soviet republic be really those stated in the Japanese-American message [the defense of Czecho-Slovaks], the Soviet Government suggests that the governments exactly formulate their wishes in the matter." Just what do we wish in the matter of the Czecho-Slovaks? That they be granted unmolested egress from Russia? Or that they remain, chartered to interfere in the domestic Russian affairs which we are pledged, ourselves, not to meddle with? Chicherin's challenge ought to be accepted. If we have any solution of the Czecho-Slovak problem that does not involve an overturn of the Soviet government we ought to set it forth. If we do not have such a solution and do not want it, we ought to say so. It is of no use to employ any other than a policy of candor with a primitive people like the Russians.

MR. ROMAN DMOWSKI, president of the Polish National Committee with headquarters in Paris, has exact specifications for the creation of a "strong and really independent Poland." A recent interview in the New York Tribune quotes him as demanding the "complete restoration of Poland, with the reestablishment of its ancient frontiers and the political union of 35,000,000 to 37,000,000 Poles." In this union he includes Upper Silesia, with its rich coal fields, part of Middle Silesia, Posen, West Prussia, with the Baltic littoral, the port of Dantzig, all of Galicia, Russian Poland on the lines of the Congress of Vienna, and a nominal union of Lithuania with Poland. Some will here recognize barren historical shores from which the waters of a genuinely Polish population have long since receded, others will hold this programme modest not to include the 3,500,000 Poles in the United States. Such nationalistic dreams will provide a warm chapter in the "self-determination of nations."

EVEN more remarkable than the almost solid vote by which it passed the man-power bill is the thoroughness with which the House, cutting out here one irrelevancy and there another, finally got the bill stripped for action. It wisely left out the anti-strike clauses, which were so drawn that they made no distinction between individual quitting and going on strike as one of a group, and which, by depriving strikers of their industrial exemptions and sending them back to their local draft boards, would have aggravated the difficulty of filling their places in essential industries. The plan to put boys of eighteen into a separate deferred class was no doubt less irrelevant, and had behind it both a genuine feeling against calling boys of this age to the colors and a genuine belief that the war could be won without them. But the plan was also a step toward permanent universal military service. Had it been adopted the advocates of such service would, after the war, have done

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their best to keep alive this bit of war legislation, to preserve universal military training of a separate class of boys of eighteen. Without either this deferred class or the anti-strike clauses the man-power bill is much more strictly a win-the-war measure than it would have been with them.

THE more we are permitted to know about our aircraft production enterprise, the plainer we see that here lies the really damaging failure in America's war effort. We appear to have accomplished little but mistakes that presumably will not have to be made again. Apparently we were defeated by our national arrogance. We were not content to accept the experience of our Allies, gained through three desperate years, as a basis upon which to build; we wanted an American aeroplane designed by American engineers, turned out in quantity by American methods. There were numerous French and British and Italian planes that had stood the test of actual fighting. There were aeroplane engineers and organizers to be borrowed if we had asked for their services. The same spirit that kept us as a nation from subordinating our inexperience to the experience of our Allies has made impossible close cooperation among our own engineers. Each one has been sincere in his desire to serve his country; each has been quite willing to work himself to death for the common good, but he wanted his own way. He wanted to be the prima donna, in General Kenly's phrase. The engineer comes by his propensity honestly. America, too, wanted to be the prima donna of the air, without going through the tedious process of instruction.

STANDARDIZATION was our great hope in aeroplane production. It is a powerful force; many of the greatest achievements of American industry may be ascribed to it. But standardization is most valuable in an industry after a long period of experimentation has reduced the problems of forms and materials to their simplest essentials. It is an excellent thing to standardize automobile construction now, when the multitude of fancies have been tried out and accepted or discarded. If we had standardized automobile production in the old days of the "horseless carriage" we might never have had an automobile worth anything. The aeroplane is, to be sure, much farther advanced, but it is still far from a condition in which we can dispense with the process of restless competitive experimentation. We should have made better progress if we had contented ourselves with arrangements to turn out borrowed types in sufficient numbers to gain the primary advantages of quantity production. The "prima donna" quality of our engineers could then have been turned to good account in devising improvements that would make the borrowed ideas really our own, instead of merely generating cross purposes in a prematurely unified domain.

CONCRETE ship construction is another field in which we ought to guard ourselves against too early standardization. In this field progress is so rapid that the technique of six months ago is practically obsolete. The "Faith," with her maiden voyage hardly completed, already looks archaic. From the point of view of present knowledge, she is a mistake. But she floats, performs service, makes money. Would that we had millions of tons of such mistakes! The concrete ships now being constructed for the Fleet Corporation will likewise look very queer a year hence. That is exactly what is to be desired; it is a measure of progress made. If our shipping authorities recognize the possibilities of progress in such construction, they will not seek to contain the art within a few standardized projects, but will endeavor to stimulate competition of designers and constructors. If alongside of the ships the government is building we had other ships building under private auspices, we could feel greater confidence that next summer our steel and wooden fleets will be greatly augmented by really serviceable concrete ships.

PROFITEERING, we learn with relief, is not an American monopoly. Herr Victor Karl Adels of the Mannesmann Arms and Munitions factories has been fined $375,000 and sentenced to six months in jail for profiteering, in three years, to the extent of at least $1,375,000. His methods appear to have been the familiar ones of commission broking and skimping on deliveries. Thus the imitative quality of the German mind is again exposed. Herr Adels appears to have been guilty of concealing far the greater part of his takings in order to escape hostile comment and the income tax. Vile imitator, again! The one anomaly in the story of Herr Adels lies in the magnitude of the fine imposed upon him. If American profiteers were compelled to disgorge in the same proportion, the German Finanzministerium would turn green with envy.

THE Keating bill, in effect reenacting the provisions of the child labor law recently annulled by decision of the Supreme Court, ought to be passed without delay. From all over the country reports are coming in of increased employment of children in factories and workshops. Employers looking to their own profits and unwilling to make the effort necessary to keep output up by better management of a

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diminishing supply of adult labor, are seizing upon the pretext of the nation's need to extend the enslavement of the children. State and local authorities are not as a rule to be depended on to defend the health and liberty of children against the clamor of private interests singing to the tune of patriotism. It is the war that has created this situation. It is as a war policy that the relaxation of standards of child welfare is defended. But war policy is a federal, not a state or local or private matter. If our resources become so fully engaged that we must enlist the toil of children in order to win the war, we shall not hesitate to make the sacrifice. But let us do it deliberately, as an organized nation clear as to our policies, fully conscious of the costs we incur, not by disorganized private initiative under the impulse of patriotism fortified by private profit.

War Aims and Party Politics

IN one point, at least, Senator Lodge's statement of war aims ought to prove illuminating to observers of American opinion. This is the evidence it offers of the extreme militancy of America. In all the other belligerent countries, Allied or enemy, the party in power represents the war spirit in its most irreconcilable form. The opposition tends toward conciliation and compromise. In America the party in power is more resolutely determined to push the war to a victorious conclusion, more extreme in its war aims, than any other Allied government. But our party of the opposition desires to occupy a position still more extreme. Senator Lodge meant not merely to give more concrete expression to American war aims than has been given by President Wilson, but to exceed the President's measure in the penalties he proposes to inflict on Germany and her confederates. The Central Powers could indeed more advantageously accept Senator Lodge's concrete demands than President Wilson's principles. Any reasonable interpretation of those principles would cover not merely the territorial changes demanded by Senator Lodge, but also the transfer of Bukowina and Transylvania to Rumania, and the liberation from Turkish rule not merely of the oppressed Christians but of the Arabian-speaking Mohammedans as well. But Senator Lodge's greater moderation is to be ascribed not to defect of the will to war, but to defect of understanding of the nationality map. This defect is further illustrated by his underwriting an independent Serbia *and* an independent Jugo-Slavia. Moreover, Senator Lodge limits Italian claims to Italia Irredenta "including Trieste" as if there were no problems of Dalmatia, the Ionian Islands, the Dodecanese, Epirus; and he promises safety to Greece, when Greece claims justly not safety alone but the realization of her national unity. But this defect is of no importance, since Senator Lodge is not vested with responsibility for American policy. What is of importance is the fact that an extremely shrewd politician, official leader of the Republicans in the Senate, finds the only hope for party success in the advocacy of war and more war.

There is another apparent deficiency in Senator Lodge's declaration that deserves much more extended consideration. He makes no reference whatever to an international organization after the war, except such as is doubtfully implied in the statement that "Constantinople must finally be taken away from Turkey and placed in the hands of the Allied nations as a free port." But the problem of Constantinople is after all relatively simple, capable of solution in terms of the traditional kind of international agreement. The really difficult problems arise in connection with the other territorial adjustments Senator Lodge proposes to make. He would have an independent Czecho-Slovak state. Does he suppose that a small state like this, commercially and industrially pretty much at the mercy of Germans and Magyars and afflicted with a powerful alien nationality scattered through its territory, would be able by its own resources to maintain its independence? Senator Lodge demands an independent Jugo-Slav state. Is he unaware of the fact that among the Jugo-Slavs there is a royal party, devoted to the dynasty of Karageorgevitch, and a republican party, whose mutual antipathies threaten an internal condition in which foreign influence might easily penetrate unless Jugo-Slavia's right to settle her own affairs is defended by other resources than her own? Is he unaware of the conflicts of interest between our Allies —between Italy and Jugo-Slavia in the matter of Dalmatia, between Italy and Greece in the matter of the Ionian Islands and Epirus, between Greece and Jugo-Slavia in the matter of Saloniki, between Jugo-Slavia and Rumania in the matter of the Banat of Temesvar—to ignore the Hungarian claim altogether? To adjudicate these competing claims in the peace conference is not enough, if what we are striving for is permanent harmony even among our friends. We may agree with Senator Lodge that first of all we must beat Germany, beat her decisively. But beating Germany is a premise, not a conclusion. The world cannot be baptized safe for democracy and thereafter be forever certain of salvation. Whether the correction of old injustices, the launching of new states is to mean anything in history depends not only on what is done during the war but on what is done after it.

To this Senator Lodge would probably assent.

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He is not an unbalanced enthusiast, hypnotized by such watchwords as national liberty and democracy, but a practical politician fully alive to the principle that what is won by effort, whether good or evil, must be maintained by effort. He cannot believe that the formula of victory is sufficient for the whole Allied group. He was not, however, formulating war aims for the Allies, but Republican party war aims for the United States. Our European Allies must maintain some kind of organization to defend what they win. But Senator Lodge is plainly not convinced that the same necessity rests upon America. After we have made our contribution to European politics by breaking the power of Germany, can we not turn our backs and leave it to our friends to piece matters together as best they can? Of course if they should get into serious difficulty with a resurgent Germany, we might later go to their aid. Or if they had difficulties among themselves we might offer our friendly offices. But with due allowance for such contingencies, a return to our ancient condition of national isolation is possible.

That this is the real drift of Senator Lodge's doctrine and the future tendency of the party he represents is a view that is confirmed in a measure by the recent pronouncements of Senator Lewis. Old party programmes, according to Senator Lewis, have been rendered obsolete by the war. But one point on which the parties are, in his opinion, certain to divide, is precisely this, the question whether America should take part in a permanent world organization or remain free to form temporary alliances for the attainment of specific objects. It goes without saying that the Democratic party, under the leadership of President Wilson, has acquired title to the policy of permanent international organization. The opposition is therefore forced to accept as its own the policy of isolation, enlarged to admit of occasional international cooperation.

From this statement of the case it might appear that the Republican tendency toward the policy of isolation is being forced upon the party by Democratic preemption of the opposing policy. But this is to do injustice to Republican instincts. There is a perfectly valid politico-economic reason why the Republican party should cling to nationalistic isolation. In spite of war time shiftings in political alignments, the Republican party will still contain the great majority of those who were formerly protectionists and who are bound to be protectionists again as soon as peace makes possible a full development of the import trade. The most telling argument of the protectionists always must be the need of national self-sufficiency in a world of potentially hostile states. And an efficient organization of the nations would greatly impair the force of this argument.

Nor is this all. A vigorous protectionist policy, whatever its intention, must in fact wreak serious injury upon the trade and industry of foreign states. We can not build up a great merchant marine by subsidies and privileges without impairing the economic interests of the British. We can not build up our manufacture of fine stuffs without impairing the interests of the French. If we wish to extend our manufactures to foreign fields we must compete vigorously with the new Belgian industry that will arise out of the desolation of war. But if Britain, France, Belgium and the rest of our Allies remain along with ourselves as parts of a system of mutual defense and mutual welfare, we shall have to give very serious consideration to the incidental injuries our economic policy may inflict upon them. We shall build ships to serve as the machinery of common carriage upon the oceans, not to serve as instruments of American trade expansion. We shall encourage manufacturing with a view to the adequate supply of ourselves and the nations leagued with us, not narrowly with a view to American self-sufficiency. In our cultivation of foreign markets we shall seek to cooperate with the nations in the League, not to drive them out by our superior competitive practice.

All this means simply that in an economic age it is inconceivable that a political League of Nations should be devoid of economic implications. We can not successfully combine a policy of political internationalism with a policy of economic nationalism. The tradition and the character of the constituency of the Republican party make it the inevitable exponent of economic nationalism. As the party leaders come to realize that national isolation is the corollary of economic nationalism, we may expect them to exhibit first indifference to the idea of a League of Nations, as Senator Lodge does already, and later open hostility to it.

Like all men they desire a stable peace, but they shrink from a peace assured by international organization. What then? Germany was the disturber of the world's peace. A beaten, but potentially powerful Germany may disturb it again. Therefore Germany must be rendered powerless. So far Senator Lodge has already gone in his reasoning. But how render Germany powerless? By destroying her.

Economic nationalism; therefore no League of Nations; therefore not merely the decisive defeat but the destruction of Germany. Such is the ultimate logic of Senator Lodge's party politics and war aims. It is good logic; but by the grace of God, a better logic rules the actual course of American policy.

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What Japan Thinks

IT is a grave disadvantage in all our dealings with Japan that while the Japanese leaders understand our mind, as they also excellently understand our language and literature, we are in dense ignorance of the state of opinion in the Island Empire. For several months we have been discussing the question of intervention in Siberia and have been arguing on the basis of generalities concerning what we believed Japanese public opinion to be, but at no time have we sought really to learn what influences are at work and what thoughts are passing through the subtle Nipponese mind. We have assumed that Japan would take at face value the protestations both of our own disinterestedness and of our secure confidence in her good intentions.

In this easy attitude of ours we seem to have been completely wrong. Either Japan has not caught our meaning or we have not caught hers or our fundamental purposes have not been mutually adjusted. In any case powerful and influential groups in Japan, as a review of the Japanese press indicates, have been painfully sensitive concerning what they feel is an implied aspersion on our part on Japan's disinterestedness. They have been disappointed by, if not irritated at our latest opposition to an independent Japanese intervention in Siberia.

It is not, of course, to be imagined that the Japanese are unanimous upon these points. Because of our ignorance of the real thought of Japan, we do not usually realize how deep are the cleavages in the public opinion of that country. We clearly recognize that all Englishmen do not think alike, nor all Frenchmen or Russians, but on the part of the unknown Nipponese we assume a compacted intellectual solidarity, which in fact does not exist.

In the intervention question, for example, a sharp difference of opinion seems from the beginning to have manifested itself and to have led to animated controversies in the public press. All parties, journals and statesmen agreed in principle that Japan should take any action, however drastic, that was necessitated by her national interests, but what that action should be—whether Japan should intervene in Siberia now or later, independently or in conjunction with other Powers, with unrestricted latitude of action or bound by pledges—involved a series of questions which divided the nation into two camps.

As a result of these differences of opinion Japan seems to have been rent by endless discussions as to the best method of procedure. Many Japanese, though preferring that their nation intervene on its own account, doubted whether such intervention would be wise in the circumstances. The powerful political party, the Seiyukai, illustrated this confrontation of opposing tendencies. One group wished to intervene immediately with very large forces and to go as far as necessary into Siberia and even into Russia proper. It held that all questions of transportation facilities, munitions and war funds could easily be settled with Allied assistance. Other members of the party, on the other hand, believed that the Siberian situation did not demand immediate independent action, and held that to send a large army (a force of one million men was mentioned) into the depths of Siberia would be utterly impossible with transportation facilities what they are at present. Because of such divided counsels, none of the three great parties, the Seiyukai, the Kensekai or the Kokuminto " adopted any resolution regarding the intervention issue." All of these parties, finding within their ranks both advocates and opponents of independent action, were condemned to silence.

Upon the whole, however, the prevailing attitude of the Japanese press seemed from the first to have favored independent action by Japan, especially if such action met with the approval of the Allies. The Herald of Asia, which itself favors independent action, gives in its issue of July 27th a list of important Tokio dailies which stand for a strong and aggressive policy. These papers include the Jiji, the Kokumin, the Yomiuri, the Hochi, the Yorozu and the Chugai Shogyo, a conservative paper read by big business men and compared by the Herald with " that much-respected organ in New York, the Journal of Commerce." Even the journals opposed to immediate action at this time are not antagonistic in principle.

The argument usually advanced by Japanese journals in favor of independent action has been somewhat as follows: Japan has a special relation to Siberia because her national interests are menaced by a possible German influence over that region. Just as America would not permit Japanese cooperation in any intervention in Mexico, so Japan should not welcome the cooperation of America in any land in which Japan has a special interest. Moreover, the nature of the expedition is likely to be such that great forces will be necessary for its successful execution, and as these forces can be supplied only by Japan, it is both unwise, as well as unfair, for America to seek to control Japan's action.

As a consequence of their irritation at America's attitude toward intervention, certain Japanese newspapers are beginning to question America's own disinterestedness in the premises. The Yorozu, for example, asks why America dislikes either to

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take military action in Russia herself or to permit Japan to do so, and it finds an answer in the theory that America wishes to be on good terms with whatever influence is uppermost in Russia, is anxious to give sympathy to and to get sympathy from Russians, and consequently that America fears that a vigorous action by Japan in Siberia would result in the extension of Japanese influence, and in the handicapping of her own activity in that region full of rich natural resources. The Yomiuri goes even further. This paper thinks that America is officious and it comes to the conclusion, according to the Herald of Asia, that "if intervention in Siberia is necessary for our self-defense, we have no obligation to seek any power's consent to our action."

In short, one effect of the negotiations between Japan and America has been to leave a certain residue of irritation among the Japanese periodicals. They resent what they feel to be an assumed guardianship over Japan by America. They resent the suspicion that they will not be allowed to act, in matters which they believe concern themselves most intimately, until America for good reasons or bad gives her consent. They have been displeased by what perhaps has been a somewhat tactless attitude of condescension on the part of members of the American Colony at Tokio. As a consequence there was manifest in the latter part of July a strong tendency on the part of the Japanese press, including the less sensational and more highly respected papers, to view the attitude of the American government on the subject of Siberian intervention "with suspicion and resentment."

The statements of the Yomiuri are illustrative of this mood. That paper claims that the Japanese suspect that it is America's own interests in Siberia that render her so uneasy about Japanese action. If Russia suspects Japan, which the Yomiuri does not believe, it is because this suspicion has been bred into the Russians by America's own attitude. America is concerned because of her own "important ambitions" in Siberia. The journal even goes so far as to enter into a discussion of the dire effects which may result from a controversy between the two countries, and it suggests the possibility of grave eventualities, which at this time it would be unwise for us to discuss. It is not to be supposed that other Japanese journals give way to similar loose imaginings, and the "plain talk" to America in which the Yomiuri indulges is gravely disavowed by other papers, such as the Herald of Asia. Nevertheless the Herald insists that Japan must look after her own interests in Siberia, and it suggests that the "alleged vexatious conditions concerning the Vladivostok expedition" need not concern Japanese so much in view of the fact that they "will in no way interfere with our sovereign right of taking whatever steps we may deem necessary for the defense of our national interests and the interests of the Far East."

What seems clear is that public opinion in the two countries has as yet not frankly met, with the result that the probable character of the intervention is somewhat differently interpreted on the two sides of the Pacific. We still speak of a "small" expedition of limited scope whereas Japan envisages the action as a large military operation. Japan does not view the Czecho-Slovaks as a very potent force. Its journals speak of this group as "a wandering mass of soldiers without any base of operations," with "no available means of maintaining their forces at their original strength" and with a discipline which is possibly not all that might be desired. "It will be too much to expect them to be capable of maintaining peace and order by themselves." The Japanese therefore must undertake a great task with ample resources.

Stabilizing Demand for Labor

WE are all familiar with the story of the thriftless Negro who could not mend his leaking roof so long as it rained and saw no need of mending it after the rain had ceased. We smile indulgently at this improvidence. Yet in our national attitude towards unemployment we adopt a similar attitude and run into the same lazy dilemma. We cannot solve the problem of unemployment during periods of actual depression, when hungry men tramp the streets in search of jobs; on the other hand, when, as today, the job is looking for the man, the whole problem of unemployment seems unreal. In summer we do not remember that we shall need coal next winter, nor in winter that we shall want ice in summer. The world would be revolutionized if men could think six months ahead.

Fortunately we need no longer argue that unemployment is no concern of the nation. Ten years, even two years ago, we should have had to meet the contention that employment and unemployment were the private affair of capitalist and wage-earner. In this land of unbounded opportunities any industrious man, it was claimed, could always find a job, and all were more likely to find jobs if the matter were left to private initiative.

Private initiative! How hollow the words now sound and how apologetic is the once confident dogmatism of the theory. The war has forever exploded the myth that all we have to do is to leave things alone. In America, as in England, France and Germany, the war has forced men to turn

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over to the state the chief means of production and to regulate monopolies, prices, wages and labor conditions. *Laissez-faire* has been adjourned for the duration of the war. We have entered upon the stage of state-capitalism in which all our main economic activities are subordinated to the public interest.

In the matter of the organization, control and protection of labor this intervention of the state has gone furthest. The government drafts millions of men; it exempts other millions on condition that they employ themselves in certain industries instead of in certain others; it takes over the railroads and the telegraph and express companies, and it launches into huge new businesses like that of shipbuilding, thus directly employing many millions of workers. The state regulates the wages, the hours of labor and the working conditions of men engaged in private industries ministering to war needs. It takes charge, it assumes responsibility.

For the time being this responsibility of the government does not extend to the finding of work for the unemployed, for that group has disappeared; the difficulty is rather to find men to do the work required. There is a severe labor shortage, and men once considered unemployable, and women who were formerly exempt from wage service, are now enlisted in the army of wage-earners. The government takes over the placing of unskilled workers, not to find jobs but to find men. In the long run, however, as has always happened in the past, these conditions will be reversed, and the nation will be faced with an enormous over-supply of labor, which the national business, if organized in the old way, will be unable to absorb. The government, having accepted responsibility for this huge recruiting of wage-earners, will face a pressing and threatening unemployment crisis.

This problem is practically unavoidable, since it is inherent in the situation. When the war ends some three to five million men, in productive ages, will be poured rapidly or slowly into the labor market. These men must find remunerative jobs. The demand for workers in the war industries will rapidly diminish. After the peace we shall not need to manufacture shells, cannon, rifles, aeroplanes, army uniforms, tents and poison gas at the same rate as today. Even in the manufacture of merchant ships there will be retrenchment or at least a preparation for retrenchment. The demand for food, coal, copper, cotton and other staples may be as great as ever, but in innumerable industries, including those which are today considered non-essential, recovery will be far from immediate. The soldiers and the men discharged from war industries will not find waiting jobs to which to return. Formerly unskilled workers and women of all degrees of skill and strength have entered into new industrial occupations, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to displace them, and even if they were displaced the burden of unemployment would be only shifted, not lifted. An iron-molder with ten years' experience before the war will have to compete for his former position with a handyman who has been promoted and trained, and the former street railway conductors, who have been drafted into the army, will find women on the rear platform. Even if heavy calls are made upon American industry to help restore a devastated Europe the problem of establishing a balance between an altered, and perhaps a shrunken demand for labor and a largely increased labor supply will be far from easy. It cannot be solved at all without changing the fundamental conditions of American industry, as they existed until the year 1917.

For we are faced not only with a new peace crisis of unemployment but also with the old, recurrent, chronic, cyclical unemployment. The conditions of acute unemployment, such as existed in 1908 and again in 1914 and 1915 are, unless foresight is exercised, likely to re-occur in 1920, 1921 or 1922. There are always men who wish to work and cannot, but while the number of our unemployed falls to as low as one million in good years it rises in bad years to as high as six millions. Moreover, there are seasons of unemployment (especially during the winter months) though these, since they can usually be tided over, are far less serious than is unemployment which comes in larger cycles. Periods of depression and unemployment invariably follow periods of keen demand for labor, and the more rapidly new workers have been drafted into industry the more wide-spread is the unemployment in the bad times that follow. Where a complete change in industry must be made, as after a great war, the unemployment is likely to be more widespread and devastating than in more normal times.

After the Civil War we met a somewhat similar difficulty, though on a much smaller scale, with great success. In 1866 a depression set in, following upon an expansion during the war, but by 1868, business had recovered and by 1870 things were booming. There were several favorable factors tending to prevent a widespread unemployment. The discharged soldiers were absorbed by a stupendously rapid growth in industrialism and by an equally rapid settlement of Western territories. Today, however, there remain no great tracts of free lands to absorb an extra labor supply, although there are still chances for additional employment upon American farms. The problem that we face is of course not one of a permanent inability to

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employ American labor. Our manufacturing, our railroad development, our vast commercial growth, will in the end make for the employment of many more millions than will be released from the army and the war industries. The problem is one of *immediate* adjustment. Within a year or less after peace has been declared, we shall have not only to go over from a war to a peace basis of production, but shall be compelled to discharge and re-employ six, eight, ten or even more millions of men, without causing an unemployment crisis. Clearly this is a task not for private initiative by business men, but for the government in behalf of the whole nation.

Hitherto little has been done to meet this forthcoming problem. We have assumed that all would be well, that the work which would have to be done after the war, and which we had hitherto been forced to neglect, would comfortably employ all our workers. In any case there was no hurry; after the war we could comfortably meet all after-the-war problems.

It will then be too late, for the essence of any solution is foresight and prevention. All successful or half-successful efforts to avert unemployment have required time for formulation and preparation. To some extent unemployment can be remedied by a "dove-tailing of seasonal industries"; to a large extent by a regularization of industries. These take time and can succeed only if prepared for in times of prosperity. The same is true of the only true preventive of unemployment, the coordination of the labor demand of the whole country by the only authority that can coordinate it; the national government.

Today that opportunity exists as it has never existed before. The government by becoming the direct employer of millions of railroad, ship-building and other workers can so regulate its own industry, can so initiate business, and so place orders that the entire labor force of the nation can be maintained at a fairly stationary level of employment. We can profitably expend billions of dollars upon the improvement of roadbed and rolling stock, upon double tracking, upon electrification, upon the building of highways and canals, upon the erection of houses for government employees and others, upon irrigation, afforestation, upon innumerable other public undertakings. This work will absorb millions of workers. If, as heretofore, we permit this work to be done whenever the happy idea strikes us (which is usually during periods of prosperity and confidence) unemployment in bad years will not be decreased and may actually be increased. If on the other hand we lay out plans for such work ten years in advance, if we proceed rapidly in periods of unemployment and more slowly in periods of normal business, we may attain a reasonably regular labor supply and demand. When private business is overactive the public demand for labor may be relatively reduced; when private business languishes the excess supply of labor may be taken up by a vast acceleration of government activity. The desirable policy is that of a strategic reserve of labor demand, the demand being thrown into the battle at the moment when the line is the weakest.

The serious study of this problem by the government, the taking of steps by which unemployment is to be averted years hence should be undertaken today, when there is an actual labor shortage. A government bureau or commission might be appointed immediately to study in the most thorough possible manner the allied problems of unemployment and reconstruction. It could profit by the studies of the British and other commissions, could utilize the federal employment agencies and all other sources of information, and could formulate a policy that might be studied and adopted months, or even years, in advance of the threatened unemployment. It would not slow the progress of the war and might even hasten that progress. The tentative, sporadic efforts to work out an adequate policy should be coordinated and strengthened, so that the work may be finished in time. When it shall have begun to rain it will be too late to mend the roof.

Owing to the scarcity of paper the Index for Volume XV, which was completed with No. 195, has been printed separately. It will be mailed on request, post free, to any subscriber who, in the course of this month, will send us his name and address on a post card directed to the NEW REPUBLIC, *421 West 21st street, New York City.*

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1918, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

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YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE: REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

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The Balkan Front

WHATEVER just grounds there may have been in the early part of the war for the contention that victory over the Central Powers might be won through vigorous operations in the Balkans, there can be little doubt that after the failure of the Gallipoli expedition and the conquest of Serbia the western Allies had no choice except to concentrate their military resources on the western front. German successes in the Balkans and the disintegration of Russian military power gave vivid reality to the danger that the war might end with a German victory. At all costs, therefore, a preponderance of Allied strength had to be established in France and Belgium. Operations elsewhere had to be governed strictly by the principle of economy of military resources. Accordingly the Balkan enterprise had to be reduced in scope to the maintenance of the defensive lines before Saloniki, to prevent Greece from going the way of Serbia and becoming a base for submarine operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

Events of the last month, however, have demonstrated that the Germans, in spite of the fact that all their effective forces are concentrated in the west, are no longer able to retain the initiative. They cannot hope to take Paris or the Channel ports and so wind up the war according to their plans. For the future they will have to content themselves with fighting a defensive war. They must expect to be pressed back, kilometre by kilometre, holding each line of defense as long as they can, in the hope that war weariness will bring peace before their projects of conquest have utterly collapsed. Their projects of conquest, let us bear in mind, are the real objects that the German lines in France have to defend. The Germans do not believe that German soil is in imminent danger of invasion. What they fear is that they will be forced to relax their hold on Serbia and the subject nationalities of the Dual Empire, on Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey and on the so-called buffer states, more properly conquered provinces, on the east. Germany's conquests of her allies and her enemies are the fruits of her four years of fighting. To keep them is her essential war aim.

The Allies no longer have to fear a German military victory. They can rest assured that Germany will soon be ready to offer a peace renouncing all fruits of victory on the west, or even simulating an acknowledgment of defeat in that quarter. But the Allies have a more distant objective. It is to compel Germany to disgorge her conquests to the east and southeast. How shall this be accomplished? Exclusively by hammering on the western front until Germany is ready to accept any terms whatsoever, or by hammering on the western front coupled with direct operations against the subject territories she holds? Shall the robber be beaten until he gives up his loot by free compact, or shall the loot be wrested from his hands while the beating is in process? This is a question not of end but of means. Its sufficient answer runs in terms of economy alone. It is therefore pertinent to inquire whether the time has not come, or is not near at hand, when military resources applied directly to the disintegration of Germany's conquests may not yield fruitful results.

But are there not geographical and topographical obstacles that render impracticable any attack upon Germany except in France and Belgium? There is profound scepticism among military critics as to the possibility of striking Germany through Russia. A sufficiently determined offensive in northern Italy would send the Austrians scurrying behind their mountain barriers; but whether those barriers could be passed by an Allied army striking for the Hungarian plain is a much more doubtful matter. The force at Saloniki has been immobilized so long that we appear justified in assuming that the topography places a veto upon effective operations in that quarter. Further east Gallipoli stands as a warning against rash hopes.

We should be on our guard, however, against the facile assumption that what was impracticable in 1914-1917 remains impracticable in 1918 and 1919. In the former period it was an open question whether with all their forces concentrated in France the western Allies could withstand the superior forces of the Germans. The German forces are no longer superior. In the near future the Allied preponderance will be more than sufficient to hold the Germans to a despairing defensive. It therefore becomes relevant to consider whether, with the forces that will be available, the Balkan barrier can possibly be broken. This question can be answered only by a detailed examination of the principal topographical features of the Balkan terrain.

The key to offensive operations in the Balkans is Macedonia. With Macedonia cleared of the enemy, the Allies could logically contemplate three enterprises, any one of which, if successful, would profoundly affect the course of the war. These are (a) the reconquest of Serbia, (b) the conquest of Constantinople and (c) the invasion of Bulgaria. Let us therefore consider whether it is

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

at all practicable to penetrate Macedonia. The difficulties that would be encountered by a direct forward movement from the Allied lines before Saloniki are well known. But the success of recent French and Italian operations in Albania suggests the possibility of a flanking movement from the Adriatic.

Before such operations can be really fruitful, it will be necessary to wrest the road from Durazzo through Tirana and Elbassan from the Austrians. This is the route of the ancient Via Egnatia, leading by practicable gradients to Ohrida and Monastir. Durazzo may be assumed to be strongly held, but an Austrian army at this point can be provisioned only with difficulty. It would have to depend for its supplies upon a single road leading from Cattaro and Skutari to Northern Albania. And even if the Austrians have employed their time to improve this road, they would encounter enormous difficulty in supplying a large army around Durazzo. There are neither manufactures nor food supplies to be had from Albania, Montenegro, Herzegovina or Dalmatia. The whole region is in fact in the grip of famine. Accordingly the real base of an Austrian army in the vicinity of Durazzo would be Fiume or Trieste, with which Cattaro is connected only by a circuitous narrow gauge railway, and by sea routes everywhere exposed to Allied attack. The Allies, on the other hand, with their control of the sea, could use as their base of supplies the port of Brindisi, eighty miles across the Adriatic, or the port of Bari, one hundred miles distant. In the circumstances the Austrians could not hold out long against an energetic effort to thrust them northward. And as the country to the east of Durazzo is a maze of barren mountains, a relatively small force posted near the sea could prevent the Austrians from interfering with the movement of Allied forces over the Via Egnatia to Ohrida Lake (see map—1).

From Ohrida Lake a satisfactory road leads to Dibra on the Black Drin; beyond Dibra a mule path down the river leads to Prizren. A very small force posted in the gorge of the Black Drin would effectually block it, thus completing the screen presented by the lofty Shar range on the left flank of an army pushing forward toward Skoplje by the routes Ohrida-Dibra-Tetovo (—2), Ohrida-Krushevo-Prilep (—3), and Monastir-Prilep-Veles (—4). Such movements would of course be carried out in conjunction with a movement of the main force before Saloniki along the Vardar (—5). The enemy might be expected to put up a stiff defense at his entrenched positions, but with the menace to his communications presented by a force driving from the west toward Skoplje such resistance could not be continued indefinitely. Driven back beyond Skoplje the Austrians would still have to depend on a single line of railway—the Nish-Skoplje-Saloniki line, as the road from Skoplje to Mitrovica is of

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little military use, since there is no road connecting Mitrovica with the Bosnian roads. The enemy could also avail himself of the wagon roads Kralevo-Raška-Mitrovica-Priština-Skoplje, Kruševac-Kuršmulie-Priština and Nish-Prokuplie-Priština. But the Allies, with the railways from Saloniki to Skoplje and from Saloniki to Monastir at their command, together with the wagon roads from Durazzo to Ohrida, from Valona to Ohrida, and from Santa Quaranta to Monastir, should be able to effect a concentration of forces which the enemy could not match. Thus the clearing of Macedonia would be far from an impossible feat.

Once Macedonia was cleared, the roads through Albania would prove of great value if it were desired to undertake the reconquest of Serbia. Small forces could cut their way through the valley of the Black Drin and menace Kossovo from the west. But any large force would have to penetrate through the Kačanik pass on the Skoplje-Mitrovica railway line—or take the route Kumanovo-Priština (—8)—the route taken by Murad I in 1389. Operating from Kossovo, an Allied force could enter Serbia along the Morava (—12) and the Ibar (—11) rivers and also over the watershed through the valley of the Jablanica (—9) and the Toplica (—10). The objective, Nish, would be of immense value, since its capture would cut the railway line connecting Bulgaria with the Teutonic powers, and the position of the Allies in the Morava valley would menace Bulgaria with invasion at many points.

But the Allies might desire to invade Bulgaria before attempting to reconquer Serbia. In that case they would not penetrate the Kačanik pass but would pursue the route Kumanovo-Palanka (—7) or the route along the Struma (—14). The second Balkan war proved that the Bulgarians cannot hold the Struma valley with an enemy in control of Macedonia. But the mountains between Macedonia and Bulgaria proper offer many exceedingly strong positions. Only from the Morava valley can an invasion of Bulgaria from the west be carried through without great difficulty (—13). This, as is well known, is the reason offered by Bulgaria for her claim to the annexation of the Serbian lands of the Morava valley.

The Allies might decide, however, neither to attempt the reconquest of Serbia nor the invasion of Bulgaria, but to strike toward Constantinople along the Aegean littoral. Such an undertaking also would require as a preliminary the clearing of Macedonia. The Allies would content themselves with establishing strong defensive positions at the Kačanik pass and on the mountains between Macedonia and Bulgaria (Ossogovo 7,000 feet and Rhodope 10,000 feet) to protect their left wing and then push eastward along the Saloniki-Seres-Demotika-Constantinople railway (—15), under the screen of the lofty Rhodope range. They would meet opposition at the numerous mountain spurs and the streams entering the Aegean from the Rhodope watershed, but, commanding the sea, they could threaten to take obstructing enemy forces from the rear. Kavala, Xanti, Makri and Dede Agatch offer points at which it would be difficult for small forces of the enemy to oppose a landing. In the circumstances the Teuto-Bulgarian commanders would not dare to concentrate any great proportion of their forces to oppose the advance of the Allies along the littoral. They would have to hold their main forces in reserve in the vicinity of Adrianople, for the protection of that gate to Bulgaria and to Constantinople. But those forces would be dependent for their supplies upon shipments over a single road from the remote centres of Bohemia and Germany while the Allies would have at their command not only the railway from Saloniki but the indefinite transport power of the sea routes, which Atlantic experience has demonstrated can be made practically safe under an adequate convoying system. It is therefore not a military impossibility to establish before Adrianople an Allied force superior to any that the Central Empires can maintain. And such a condition would spell the end of Bulgarian and Turkish belligerency.

It is not here asserted that any one of the three enterprises proposed could be carried out without large forces and extensive preparations for transport and supply, although the requirement for men may be considered much reduced by the fact that there are present in the Balkans a formidable force at Saloniki, a large Greek army and considerable forces, actual and potential, of Serbs and other Jugo-Slavs that would rally around any international force powerful enough to give promise of fruitful operations. Such Balkan forces may be regarded as an Allied capital yielding at present only minimum returns but capable of yielding abundantly if adequately supported. Whatever allowance we choose to make for the local forces available, we cannot but agree that the problem is merely one of establishing a preponderance of Allied forces over such forces as the Central Powers, with their dependence upon land routes of limited capacity, are capable of maintaining. The engrossing demands of the western front have prevented the Allies from establishing such a preponderance, down to the present. The point of significance is that it is this engrossing of resources by the west, not special topographical obstacles, that has kept the Balkans in the condition of a neglected front. As a fact, with a preponderance

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of resources, the Allies would be able to turn to their own account most of the topographical features that now appear as obstacles to their operations.

It will be observed that in the course of this argument we have assumed that the Bulgarians and Turks will persist in their belligerency to the end. The assumption is obviously extreme in its caution. Both nations are war weary; they are buoyed up only by the hope of victory. The two Balkan wars demonstrated how quickly the fighting spirit of both Bulgaria and Turkey collapses when the hope of victory disappears. And what hope would remain in the Bulgarian breast if against German boasts and promises he found himself compelled to balance an Allied force actually in Macedonia, thrusting him out of the lands he regarded as his safe plunder? How much spirit would the Turks retain with an Allied force moving forward resistlessly along the littoral route, which German, Greek and Turkish strategists regard as the one practicable route for the conquest of Constantinople? Something would break in the Balkans if the Allies possessed themselves of the Macedonian key. And with the arch of their conquests broken in, the Germans would seek in vain to save any part of the structure. Their lines might hold tenaciously on the west, but they would be ready to accept a peace leaving them nothing but their legitimate rights as a nation among nations, which no Allied statesman would deny them.

VLADISLAV R. SAVIČ.

It Is War

TEN days after the Germans launched their "peace offensive" my regiment was relieved from front line duty and returned to rest near Mezy, which was the point where the German High Command had determined definitely to break through in their mad rush upon Paris. Some six weeks before, the Yanks of this now famous regiment of regulars were posted to defend one half of the mouth of the valley of which Mezy was the centre. With the usual directness of Yankees they interpreted "defense of the line" literally, and elected to stay there when Heinie finally made his attack. All through a barrage, which the French declare was equalled only at Verdun, the 2nd battalion of the —th Infantry clung to the poor shelter of shallow dugouts scooped into the sides of a railway embankment, which was their main line of defense. A few outposts hovered in shallow trenches along the banks of the Marne from twelve midnight, when the bombardment commenced, until four a. m., when the barrage began to lift and Heinie advanced only forty yards behind it in immense droves.

The main attack on this part of the line was delivered along a front of less than two hundred and fifty yards, all of which was held by G company of the —th. Heinie concentrated three battalions on this one company, the 17th Prussian Battalion, one battalion of grenadiers, and one battalion of their machine gun corps. G company was supported by two machine guns from the —th machine gun Battalion. Their right flank was held and protected by H company of our regiment, but on the left the —th Infantry had withdrawn, allowing the Huns at times to completely surround our brave 2nd battalion.

In the —th Infantry "orders is always orders" and orders said "hold the line." G company held—but at terrific cost. Three of six officers were killed. Forty-one men answered roll call when the battle ended, while 168 had entered the action. But Heinie paid, too, and he held no line, commencing instead a retreat which at the time I write this has not yet ended. G company turned in 537 prisoners, including officers as high in rank as major. They killed upwards of seven hundred. During the course of the action 13 machine guns were brought in by personal acts of gallantry on the part of single men and groups of men not larger than a squad. In all 52 machine guns were captured by this company, 39 being abandoned by Heinie when he finally broke and fled back across his pontoon bridges.

It was ten days after the battle, ten days full of counter-attacks, gas shells, and the general meanness of war.

On the eighth day our regiment, led by Colonel MacA—— himself, crossed the Marne and pushed Heinie back along the hills away from the river Marne. That evening's communiqué spoke of Jaulgonne as an American possession. Then came a day of holding on while liaison was straightened out. That night our tired organization was relieved, fresh troops taking up the big push, and we found ourselves back in "rest billets" overlooking Mezy battlefield.

What curious feelings must have stirred the breast of Company G's commander as he surveyed that field once more. Mixture of sorrow and pride as he moved among his dead heroes, aiding in the work of identification and of burial. For ten days' sun and weather and flies had done their worst. Only pitiful tattered rags and stinking rotten flesh remained. War in all its utter horror and frightfulness had visited that place. Small comfort from the tiers of gray-green which paid for each olive drab—but it was essential comfort. Without that the sight was unbearable.

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I joined Company G after they had fought their brave fight. En route for the front from school at the moment the storm broke, I was sent to them to replace one of their lost officers only in time to take part in the advance which finally crushed German hopes. I may therefore tell of this brave company with only envy that their glory is not mine.

On this morning ten days after the fight I went over the battlefield, at first with repugnant curiosity to see how Heinie had been repulsed. I knew some of the splendid Americans who lay dead there. I knew them for the finest our country affords. At first I was proud to see the little circle of dead Germans that spoke of the unwavering courage which had met and defeated them. I was proud of my breed. But, as I waded through the waving wheat I picked up a photograph. It was of a young officer of the Prussian Guard—a boy, one of the clear featured chaps whom one might instinctively pick from a crowd for a friend. I picked up another, a post card. One of my men translated the words of love a good son might write to his mother. Surely the thing which makes organized murder of boys like these by boys like those I knew a virtue is the most hideous crime of humanity. It is war. And as long as war shall be such things must go on.

I have talked with men who have served in this war for as much as three years. They speak of being "fed up." I never knew what they meant until I digested the meaning of that battlefield. I have lost many friends in the present action, I could stand that were I sure this war will be the last in history. I must go on. So must we all. In the very magnitude of this thing lies our hope—for surely war is the world's best argument for peace, and a generation which has been so scourged as has this will place war among the things that cannot be.

MARC P. DOWDELL,
2nd Lt., Inf. R. C., A. E. F.

The Education of Joan and Peter

IX

Peter at Howth

IF Oswald in the spring of 1914 could see no immediate catastrophe ahead, he could at least see that a vast disintegrative process had begun in the body of European civilization. The British mind hates crisis; it abhors the word "now." This disintegration, he told himself accordingly, was a thing to go on by stages, to be replaced by stages; it would give place to a new order, a better order, "someday"; everything just and good was going to happen someday, the liberation of India, the contentment of Ireland, economic justice, political and military efficiency. It was all coming—it was always coming and never arriving, that new and better state of affairs. What did go on was disintegration. The British mind believes that you can cool water forever and that it will never freeze, that you saw at a tree forever and that it will never fall, that there is always some sand left above in the hourglass. When the English Belshazzar sees the writing on the wall, he welcomes the appearance of a new if rather sensational form of publication, and he sits back to enjoy it at his leisure. . . .

There is a risk that the catastrophic events of 1914 may blind the historian to the significance of the spinning straws of 1913. But throughout Europe the sands were trickling before the avalanche fell. The arson of the suffragettes, the bellicose antics of the Unionist leaders in Ulster, General Gough's Curragh mutiny, were all parts of the same relaxation of bonds that launched the gray-clad hosts of Germany into Belgium. The great world of labor was also seething with the same spirit of almost aimless insurrection. The pretensions of the old social system that trade unionism had scarcely challenged were now being subjected throughout all western Europe to a pitiless scrutiny by a new and more educated type of employee.

The old British trade unionism had never sought much more than increased wages and a slightly higher standard of life; its acceptance of established institutions had been artlessly complete; it had never challenged the authority nor the profits of the proprietor. It had never proposed more than a more reasonable treaty with the masters, a fairer sharing of the good gifts of industry. But infatuated by the evil teachings of an extreme individualism, a system of thoughts which was indeed never more than a system of base excuses dressed up as a philosophy, the directing and possessing classes had failed altogether to agree with their possible labor adversary quickly while they were yet in the way with him. They had lacked the intelligence to create a sympathetic industrial mentality, and the conscience to establish a standard of justice. They left things alone until the grit of a formless discontent had got into every cog of the industrial machinery. Too late, the employers were now conceding the modest demands that labor had made in the eighties and nineties, they were trying to accept the offers of dead men; they found themselves face to face with an entirely less accommodating generation. This new labor movement was talking no longer of shorter hours and higher pay but of the social revolution. It did not demand better treatment from the capitalist; it called him a profiteer, and asked him to vanish from the body politic. Higher wages would not pacify it; shorter hours would not pacify it. It threatened sabotage of every sort, and a steady, incessant broadening antagonism of master and man. Peter, half sympathetic and half critical, talked about it to Oswald one day.

"They all say, 'I'm a Rebel!'" said Peter. "'Rebel' is their cant word."

"Yes, but rebel against what?"

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"Oh! the whole system."

"But how are they going to alter it?"

"That's all vague. Altogether vague. Cole and Mellor and those Cambridge chaps preach Guild Socialism to them, but I don't know how far they take it in—except that they agree that profit is unnecessary. But the fundamental fact is just blind boredom and the desire to smash up things. Just on the off chance of their coming better. The employer has been free to make the world for them, and this is the world he has made. That's how they look at it. They are bored by his face, bored by his automobile, bored by his knighthood, bored by his country house——"

"But what can they do?"

"Make things impossible."

"They can't run things themselves."

"They aren't convinced of that. Anyhow if they smash up things the employer goes first, and he's the chap they seem to be principally after—. . ."

Peter reflected. Then he gave a modern young Englishman's view of the labor conflict. "The employers have been pretty tidy asses not to see that the workpeople get a better, more amusing life than they do. It was their business and their interest to do so. It could have been managed easily. But they're so disloyal. And mean. They not only sweat labor themselvess but they won't stir a finger to save it from jerry-built housing, bad provisioning, general ugliness, bad investments, rotten insurance companies—every kind of rotten old thing. Anyone may help keel *their* sheep. They won't even amuse them. Why couldn't they set up decent theatres for them, and things like that? It's so stupid of them. There's enough for everyone nowadays and over. It's the first business of employers to see workpeople get their whack. What good are they if they don't do that? But they never have. Labor is convinced now that they never will. They've got their people angry and bitter now, they've destroyed public confidence in their ways, and it serves them jolly well right if the workmen make things impossible for them. I think they will. I hope they will."

"But this means breaking up the national industries," said Oswald. "Where is this sort of thing going to end?"

"Oh! things want shaking up," said Peter.

Peter, warming with his subject, walked to and fro across the Pelham Ford lawn beside Oswald, proposing to rearrange industrialism as one might propose to reshuffle a pack of cards.

"But suppose things smash up," said Oswald.

"Nowadays," said Peter, "so many people read and write, so much has been thought out, there is so big a literature of ideas in existence, that I think we could recover from a very considerable amount of smashing. We have to smash. What holds us back are fixed ideas. Take Profit. We're used to Profit. Most business is done for profit still. But why should the world tolerate profit at all? It doesn't stimulate enterprise; it only stimulates knavery. And Capital. Financial Capital is just blackmail by gold—gold rent. We think the state itself even can't start a business going or employ people without first borrowing money. Why should it borrow money? Why not, for state purposes, create it? Yes. No money would be any good if it hadn't the state guarantee. Gold standard, fixed money fund, legitimate profits and so on; that's the sort of fixed idea that is in the way nowadays. It won't get out of the way just for reason's sake. The employers keep on with these old fixed ideas, naturally, because so it is they have been made, but the workpeople believe in them less and less. There must be a smash of some sort—just to shake ideas loose . . ."

Oswald surveyed his ward. So this was the young man's theory. Not a bad theory. Fixed Ideas!

"There's something to be said for this notion of Fixed Ideas," he said. "Yes. But isn't this 'I'm a Rebel' business, isn't that itself a Fixed Idea?"

"Oh, certainly!" said Peter cheerfully. "We poor human beings are always letting our ideas coagulate. That's where the whole business seems to me so hopeless. . . ."

At Whitsuntide Oswald carried off Peter to Dublin. On the Sunday afternoon of their stay Powys motored them through the city by way of Donnybrook and so on round the bay to Howth to see the view from Howth Head. Powys drove with a stray guest beside him. Behind, Peter imparted impressions to Oswald.

"I don't like these high walls," he said. "I've never seen such a lot of high walls. . . . It's just as if they all shut themselves in from one another."

"Fixed Ideas, Peter?"

"They *are* rather like Fixed Ideas. I suppose high walls are fun to climb over and throw things over. But—it's uncivilized."

"Everybody," grumbled Peter, "is given to fixed ideas, but the Irish have 'em for choice. All this rot about Ireland a Nation and about the Harp, which isn't properly their symbol, and the dear old Green Flag, which isn't properly their color! . . . They can't believe in that stuff nowadays. . . . But *can* they? In our big world? And about being a Black Protestant and pretending Catholics are poison, or the other way round. What are Protestants and Catholics now? . . . Old, dead squabbles. . . . Dead as Druids. . . . Keeping up all that bickering stuff, when a child of eight ought to know nowadays that the Christian God started out to be a universal, charitable God. . . . If Christ came to Dublin the Catholics and Protestants would have a free fight to settle which was to crucify him. . . ."

"It's the way with them," said Oswald. "We've got to respect Irish opinion."

"It doesn't respect itself. Everywhere else in the world, wherever we have been, there's been at least something like the germ of an idea of a new life. But here! When you get over here you realize for the first time that England is after all a living country trying to get on to something—compared with this merry-go-round. . . . It's exactly like a merry-go-round churning away. It's the atmosphere of a country fair. An Irishman hasn't any idea of a future at all, so far as I can see—except that perhaps his grandchildren will tell stories of what a fine fellow he was. . . ."

Oswald was not sure of the extent of Peter's audience. "The susceptibilities of a proud people, Peter," he whispered, with his eye on the back of their host.

"Bother their susceptibilities. Much they care for *our* susceptibilities. The worst insult you can offer a a grownup man is to humor him," said Peter. "What's the good of pretending to be sympathetic with all this Wearing of the Green? It's like our White Rose League. Let 'em do it by all means if they want to, but don't let's pretend we think it romantic and beautiful and all the rest of it. It's just posing and dressing up, and it's a nuisance, Nobby. All Dublin is posing and dressing up and playing at rebellion, and so is all Ulster. The Volunteers of the eighteenth century all over again. It's like historical charades. And they've pointed loaded guns at each other.

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Only idiots point loaded guns. Why can't we get out of it and leave them to pose and dress up and then tell anecdotes and anecdotes and anecdotes about it until they are sick of it? If ever they are sick of it. Let them have their Civil War if they want it; let them keep on with Civil Wars forever; what has it got to do with us?"

"You're a Home Ruler then," said Oswald.

"I don't see that we English do any good here at all. What are we here for anyhow? The Castle's just another Fixed Idea, something we haven't the mental vigor to clear away. Nobody does any good here. We're not giving them new ideas, we're not unifying them, we're not letting Ireland out into the world—which is what she wants—we're not doing anything but just holding on."

"What's that?" said Powys suddenly over his shoulder.

"Peter's declaring for Home Rule," said Oswald.

"After his glimpse of the slums of Dublin?"

"It's out of malice. He wants to leave Irishmen to Irishmen."

"Ulster says *No!*" said Powys. "Tell him to talk to Ulster," and resumed a conversation he had interrupted with the man beside him.

At the corner where Nassau street runs into Grafton street they were held up for some lengthy minutes by a long procession that was trailing past Trinity College and down Grafton street. It had several bands, and in the forefront of it went National Volunteers in green uniforms, obviously for the most part old soldiers; they were followed by men with green badges, and then a straggle of Larkinites and various friendly societies with their bands and banners, and then by a long dribble of children and then some work girls, and then a miscellany of people who had apparently fallen in as the procession passed because they had nothing else to do. As a procession it was tedious rather than impressive. The warm afternoon—it was the last day in May—had taken the good feeling out of the walkers. Few talked, still fewer smiled. The common expression was a long-visaged discontent, a gloomy hostile stare at the cars and police cordon, an aimless disagreeableness. They were all being very stern and resolute about they did not quite know what. They meant to show that Dublin could show as ugly a chin as Carson. Between the parts of the procession were lengthy gaps. It was a sunshiny, dusty afternoon, and the legs of the processionists were dusty to the knees, their brows moist, and their lips dry. There was an unhurried air about them of going nowhere in particular. It was evident that many of their banners were heavy. "What's it about?" asked Oswald.

"Lord knows," said Powys impatiently. "It's just a demonstration."

"Is this all? Why don't we cut across now and get on?"

"There's more coming. Don't you hear a fresh band?"

"But the police could hold it up for a minute and let all these tram-cars and automobiles acrosss."

"There'd be a fight," said Powys. "They daren't."

. . .

The last dregs of the procession passed reluctantly out of the way. It faded down Grafton street into a dust cloud and a confusion of band noises. The policemen prepared to release the congested traffic. Peter leant out to count the number of trams and automobiles that had been held up. He was still counting when the automobile turned the corner.

They shook Dublin off and spun cheerfully through the sunshine along the coast road to Howth. It was a sparkling bright afternoon and the road was cheerful with the prim happiness of many couples of Irish lovers. But that afternoon peace was the mask worn by one particular day. If the near future could have cast a phantom they would have seen along this road a few weeks ahead of them the gunrunners of Howth marching to the first foolish bloodshed in Dublin streets. . . .

They saw Howth Castle, and while the others stayed behind Oswald and Peter went on, through some huge hedges of clipped beech and up a steep winding path amidst great bushes of rhododendra in full flower to the grey rock and heather of the crest. They stood in the midst of one of the most beautiful views in the world. Northward they looked over Ireland's Eye at Lambay and the blue Mourne mountains far away; eastward was the lush green of Meath, southward was the long beach of the bay sweeping round by Dublin to Dalkey backed by more blue mountains that ran out eastward to the Sugar Loaf. Below their feet the pale castle clustered amidst its rich greenery, and to the east the level blue of the Irish Sea sustained one single sunlit sail. It was rare that the sense of beauty flooded Peter, as so often it flooded Joan, but this time he was transported.

"But this is altogether beautiful," he said like one who is taken by surprise.

And then as if to himself, "How beautiful life might be! How splendid life might be!"

Oswald was standing on a ledge below Peter, and with his back to him. He waited through a little interval to see if Peter would say any more. Then he pricked him with "only it isn't."

"No," said Peter with the sunlight gone out of his voice. "It isn't."

He went on talking after a moment's reflection.

"It's as if we were hypnotized and couldn't get away from mean things, beastly suspicions and stale quarrels. I suppose we are still half apes. I suppose our brains *set* too easily and rapidly. I suppose it's easy to quarrel yet and still hard to understand. We take to jealousy and bitterness as ducklings take to water."

"Is there no way out, Peter?"

"If some great idea would take hold of the world!" said Peter. . . .

"There have been some great ideas," said Oswald.

"If it would take hold of one's life." Peter finished his thought. . . .

"There has been Christianity," said Oswald.

"Christianity!" Peter pointed at the distant mist that was Dublin. "Sour Protestants," he said, "and dirty priests setting simple people by the ears."

"But that isn't true Christianity."

"There isn't true Christianity," said Peter compactly. . . .

"Well, there's love of country then," said Oswald.

"That Dublin corporation is the most patriotic and nationalist in the world. Fierce about it. And it's got complete control there. It's green in grain. No English need apply. . . . From the point of view of administration that town is a muck heap—for patriotic crowings. Look at their dirty ill-paved streets. Look at their filthy slums! See how they let their blessed nation's children fester and die!"

"There are bigger ideas than patriotism. There are ideas of empire, the Pax Britannica."

"Landowne and Carson smuggling guns."

"Well, is there nothing? Do *you* know of nothing?" Oswald turned on his ward for the reply.

"There's a sort of idea, I suppose."

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"But what idea?"

"There's an idea in our minds."

"But what is it, Peter?"

"Call it Civilization," Peter tried.

"I believe," he went on, weighing his words carefully, "as you believe really, in the Republic of Mankind, in universal work for a common end—for freedom, welfare and beauty. Haven't you taught me that?"

"*Have* I taught you that?"

"What else can there be?"

"I suppose I have been coming to that myself," said Oswald.

"I think you've always been there. That seems to me to be the commonsense aim for all humanity. You're awake to it. You've awakened me to it and I believe in it. But most of this world is still deep in its old Fixed Ideas, walking in its sleep, the Fixed Ideas of class and nationality, of partizan religion, race superstition, and all the rest of 'em. These things hold the mind of the world. And it won't wake up. It won't wake up. . . . What can we *do?* We've got to a sort of idea, it's true. But here are these Irish, for example, naturally wittier and quicker than you or I, hypnotized by Orange and Green, by Protestant and Catholic, by all these stale things—drifting towards murder. It's murder is coming here. You can smell the bloodshed coming on the air—and people like we are can't do a thing to prevent it. Not a thing. The silliest bloodshed it will be. The silliest bloodshed the world has ever seen. We can't do a thing to wake them up. . . ."

"We're *in* it," said Peter in conclusion. "We can't even save ourselves."

"But don't you think, Peter, there must be a lot of people thinking now rather as we do?"

Peter flung a gesture of despair to the blue heavens. "*Where?*" he asked.

"I've been wanting to get at your political ideas for a long time," said Oswald. "You really think, Peter, there might be a big world civilization, a world republic did you call it?—without a single slum hidden in it anywhere, with the whole of mankind busy and happy, the races living in peace, each according to its aptitudes, a world going on—going on steady and swift to still better things."

"Yes."

"Power and Unity?"

"How can one believe anything else? Don't you?"

"But how do we get there, Peter?"

"Oh, how do we get there?" echoed Peter. "How do we get there?"

He danced a couple of steps with vexation.

"I don't *know,* Nobby," he cried. "I don't know. I can't find the way. I'm making a mess of my life. I'm not getting on with my work. You *know* I'm not. . . . Either we're mad or this world is. Here's all these people in Ireland letting a solemn humbug of a lawyer with a heavy chin and a lumpish mind muddle them into a civil war—and *that's* reality! That's life! The Solemn League and Covenant—copied out of old history books! That's being serious! And over there in England, across the sea, muddle and muck and nonsense indescribable. Oh! and we're *in* it!"

"But aren't there big movements afoot, Peter, social reform, the labor movement, the emancipation of women, big changes like that?"

"Only big discontents."

"But doesn't discontent make the change?"

"It's just boredom that's got them. It isn't any disposition to *make.* Labor is bored, women are bored, all Ireland is bored. I suppose Russia is bored and Germany is getting bored. She is boring all the world with her soldiering. How bored they must be in India too—by us! The everlasting East—not so much living as hiccuping up its great great grandfather. The day bores its way round the earth now—like a mole. Out of sight of the stars. But boring people doesn't mean making a new world. It just means boring on to decay. It just means one sort of foolish old fixed idea rubbing and sawing against another, until something breaks down. . . . Oh! I want to get out of all this. I don't *like* this world of ours. I want to get into a world awake. I'm young and I'm greedy. I've only got one life to live, Nobby. . . . I want to spend it where something is being made. Made for good and all. Where clever men can do something more than sit overlong at meals and tell spiteful, funny stories. Where there's something better to do than play about with one's brains and viscera! . . ."

H. G. Wells.

A COMMUNICATION

On Dismembering Austria

A RECENT issue of the New Republic contained, by way of answer to Professor Giddings, a powerful editorial plea for a negotiated settlement of this war. A later issue (June 15th) threw the influence of the New Republic for the first time on the side of those who demand the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. May an English contributor, who has never yet differed on any vital issue from the New Republic, use your friendly columns to urge that these two opinions are incompatible? Let us dismiss any trivial or verbal issue. No competent partisan of a "dictated" peace supposes that the war can end without negotiations and a treaty. Even the Boers secured some concessions and negotiated a treaty, and the cruel peace of Brest-Litovsk was registered after public debates in a formal instrument. It is equally true that no competent advocate of a negotiated peace supposes that it can be reached by the operations of pure reason; behind the negotiators there will be some balance of forces. This reference to force must include a reckoning of the future prospects of the belligerents as well as their past achievements, and an estimate of the economic stranglehold of the Allies must be set against the "war-map." Dictation in short implies a treaty, and negotiation presupposes potential force. When this approximation between the two positions is made, there still remains a fundamental difference. A "dictated" settlement is one which the enemy will never of his own free will accept. He will submit to it only if the course of the war has left him, at the end, without the means of resistance or of bargaining. It follows, in nine cases out of ten, that his forced acquiescence is temporary: he will regard the peace as a truce, and set to work by armaments, intrigue, and eventually by recourse to arms, to reverse a settlement which is for him intolerable. A "negotiated" settlement is one which the enemy can regard on the whole as equitable. It may contain distasteful clauses and involve heavy sacrifices of his pride and even some sacrifices of real interests. But there is gain (moral or material) as well as loss, and the total result is one which the mass of his nation can accept without vowing at the first opportunity to reverse it. The

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true dividing line in principle between the two kinds of settlement turns on this element of acquiescence. This test, be it noted, is subjective. A dictated settlement might seem to the Allies one which the enemy *ought* to accept: their orators might even acclaim it as the embodiment of ideal justice. It would fail to achieve an enduring peace, however, if the main body of the enemy people—as distinct from his Junkers on the one hand or the Minority Socialists on the other—regarded it as an intolerable injury and an insufferable humiliation. The distinction in principle involves obvious consequences as to the duration and pursuit of the military struggle. A negotiated peace, if the economic weapon is skilfully used, may be attainable at the moment when the hopes of a German victory in the West are seen to be illusions. A dictated peace, if it must really contain articles which seem to the mass of Germans intolerable, could be imposed only when all organized military resistance had been finally broken. It involves either a collapse of the German armies comparable to the Russian demoralization, or else the crossing of the Rhine, and the occupation of Vienna, if not of Berlin. It lies, in short, even on the most sanguine view, several years ahead.

Let us now apply this test of "acquiescence" to the policy of dismembering Austria-Hungary. There are here two distinct questions. Would the enemy accept this solution, if he retained any power of resistance, or any asset with which to bargain? Would he, if once he had been forced to accept it, consent to treat it as a permanent and irreversible fact? Over the first of these questions there can be no dispute among those who know anything of German opinion. No one in Germany—save some of the Minority Socialists—would consent to make peace on the basis of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, while any means of resistance was left, and everyone—excepting possibly the more extreme members of the Socialist Minority—would support the continuance of the war to maintain some kind of unity in the Hapsburg Dominions. The reasons are so obvious that a bare enumeration should suffice. (1) To consent to the dismemberment of one's chief ally would mean that one accepted not merely total defeat, but abandoned all pretensions to be a great power or a factor to be reckoned with among civilized peoples. (2) It would mean a surrender of honor as gross and painful, from the German standpoint, as the abandonment of Belgium or France would be to us. (3) While the better German opinion would be sensitive to this point of honor, the more materialist opinion would see in it the surrender of all economic ambitions, however legitimate, not merely in Austria, but over the entire East. (4) It would mean the abandonment of many millions of Germans to the rule of alien and bitterly hostile majorities. (5) It would leave Germany in the society of nations without a single friend, and ensure in fact that "encirclement" and isolation which has always been the German nightmare. (6) A military defeat so complete that Austria could be dismembered would bring with it the possibility of every other consequence distasteful to the Germans, certainly the loss of Alsace, Posen and Silesia and the Colonies. The conclusion can hardly be resisted that to adopt the dismemberment of Austria as a war-aim commits us to a "Bitter-endian" policy. It means war until the last German army has surrendered, and until Austria (if not Germany) is occupied by Allied forces. For my part I doubt the possibility, with any time allowance whatever, of any victory so shattering as this, but no sane being would expect it within less than two or three years.

To all this the answer of the New Republic would be, I take it, that while the enemy will certainly not accept this solution until he is beaten, he may acquiesce in it thereafter, on condition that we create a League of Nations. The League, on this view, will guarantee to him a measure of justice in the future, and ensure to him equality of commercial opportunity, while it will stand above the little wrangling States of dismembered Austria, to keep the peace among them and protect racial minorities. That is to my mind, if I may speak bluntly, the most pathetic and baseless illusion which idealists could cherish. Against it I venture to set this proposition. There will and can be no League of Nations whatever—there may of course be a military super-alliance—save on the basis of a negotiated settlement. Viscount Grey has often used a rather peculiar word from 1914 onwards, which will help to convey what I mean. He has spoken of "conference" as the antithesis of force and the key to international relations. He means, I take it, by "conference," a meeting together in which peoples or Powers not merely exchange views, but take account of each other's needs and interests, fears and hopes, ambitions and even prejudices. By "conference" this war might have been avoided. By "conference" alone may we hope to live peacefully hereafter. It is to my mind no less axiomatic that it is by "conference" that we must end this war. It may require force, more force, even what Mr. Wilson calls "force to the uttermost," to bring the enemy to a true conference. But unless he and we come to the settlement as to a true conference, we can build no League of Nations upon it. That is not a copy-book maxim, but a perfectly realistic calculation. To put the point concretely, if we insist on enforcing the extremer Allied view so absolutely in a matter so vital to Germany as to dismember Austria-Hungary, it will be hopeless to expect any German to regard us as his possible friends and colleagues in a League of Peace. Such a policy would very naturally strike him much as his own performance at Brest-Litovsk strikes us. "Thanks," he would say, "to numbers, to time, and to American aid, these people had me at last in their power. They made an extreme and merciless use of their power. They blotted out my chief ally. What trust can I place in them? Shall I enter their League, to be voted down, twenty to one, in every future issue? Beaten though I am, I shall be safer to trust to my own right arm, and to work with such shrewdness as I possesss, for the dissolution of the encircling alliance." Already we find Count Hertling hinting that the idea of the League is merely a disguise for Anglo-American world-hegemony. If we dismember Austria, as the Junkers have half-dismembered Russia, is this impression likely to fade? I conclude then that Germany would not join the League of Nations.

Let us next look at the proposition from the Allied standpoint. It is a double proposition. (1) We are all to agree to prolong the war until we are physically able to dismember Austria. (2) We are then to perform what will be, under the most favorable conditions, the moral miracle of creating a universal League of Nations. All politics are a problem in dynamics. You have therefore to find, somehow, in Europe, statesmen and parties who will forward this dual American policy. You cannot find them. You can with ease find backers for each of these policies by turns, but you will find no considerable body of support even today for both together, and there will be less, as time goes on. The people who want an immense rearrangement of the map of Europe, are indifferent or hostile to the League of Nations. Those who care about the

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League of Nations are indifferent or opposed to sweeping territorial changes. If you are bent on the territorial changes you must hope for the maintenance of the former school in power. You must desire that the influence of Lord Northcliffe shall prevail in England and that of MM. Poincaré and Clemenceau in France. You must desire the defeat of the tendencies represented by the Manchester Guardian, the Nation and the Labor Party in England, and of the entire Socialist Party in France. That of course is not your position, but you must reckon with the fact that none of these moderating forces would consent to prolong the war in order to dismember Austria.

On the other hand, if through the victory of the extremer war-party due to American backing, the war is prolonged, and Austria is dismembered, then it is axiomatic that you will not get your League of Nations. To be sure, these people will, out of deference to Mr. Wilson, pay a certain lip-service to the idea. They will perhaps accept the principle of arbitration, but they will cling to their commercial policy, which aims, by a monopoly of raw materials, at destroying German trade. There can be no League of Nations on that basis. The War can be prolonged for such purposes as the dismemberment of Austria, only by the triumph among all the European Allies of the extreme war-party. These war-parties, if they go on to the bitter end, will insist on exacting the bitter price. In plain words, a bitter-end settlement means re-drawing the map of Europe on the lines of the secret treaties. You will have to consent to an Italian Adriatic, a Rumanian Banat, a partitioned Turkey, and possibly even to a French Left Bank of the Rhine. American influence, you say, will suffice to prune away these excessive claims. Sancta simplicitas! America has just one card to play at the settlement. She can say that she will not underwrite a League of Nations unless it rests on a just settlement. But that presupposes that the extreme war-parties want a League of Nations. They do not want it, and some of them—in France and Italy at least—are frank enough to say so.

In these moral conditions—assuming physical omnipotence—by what miracle are you to get even a moderately equitable dismemberment of Austria? No expert, however just and wise, could make an ideal scheme of dismemberment. There is no possibility of disentangling these mixed races without sacrificing large minorities. If you give only Transylvania to Rumania, you may please fifty-five per cent of its population to the injury of the remaining forty-five per cent, and even then are you sure that a feudal and backward Rumania is a better mistress than Hungary, feudal also and intolerant, but some generations further on the road of social evolution? If you make over the German thirty-five per cent of the Bohemian population to Czech rule, where are your guarantees? No race deserves more sympathy than the Czechs, but were its sufferings a good school for power? I judge its disposition from two signs—(1) it refuses all proposals for a redrawing of frontiers which would exclude the purely German districts on the periphery of Bohemia; (2) it asks for a "corridor" a hundred kilometers broad, through alien country, to link it with the Adriatic coast. Now you may feel sure that American influence could prune away these excrescences from the Czech claims. Perhaps. The fact remains that it is to a nationalism so extreme as this, that you are going to confide the fate of a big majority. Everywhere you encounter the same extreme attitude. The Serbs must claim not merely the true Serb country, but half Albania and nearly all the Bulgarian region of Macedonia as well. Of Italian claims I need not speak; their extravagance is well understood. The Rumans must needs claim not merely Translyvania but the Banat and some Ruthenian and Magyar counties as well. This racial chauvinism creates two problems.

Firstly, you must tear up the existing treaties—no easy matter—and persuade the Allies to accept less than they claimed. That would be easy before victory, but almost impossible if the Allied troops were actually in Vienna, Prague and Budapest. If in the process you offend an Ally, you may have made a potential backer for a German revanche. But even if you can get a dismemberment as relatively fair as the mixed ethnography of Central Europe allows, the psychological problem remains. Races steeped to the lips in nationalist chauvinism have, somehow, got to live peaceably, if not happily, together. You will invoke the League of Nations. You will arrange—against the wishes of most of your Allies—an enforced system of customs unions, free ports, railway conventions, river conventions, and impose a whole charter of linguistic and cultural rights for minorities. In short, you will have to do from outside, through the vast cumbersome structure of a World League, exactly what a federated Austria-Hungary would do so much more easily for itself. You are like a surgeon who first breaks every bone in his patient's body in order to set them all again. Unless you unify this Danubian area you will make an angry, bloody, super-Balkan chaos. If you unify it, have you gained anything by prolonging the war and deposing the present Hapsburg, who seems to be about the sanest man in his dominions? One must ask oneself what the physical and moral condition of Austria will be after two or three more years of war. Starvation and disease will have racked its populations. Defeat will bring the dissolution of authority and the spasmodic, irrational creation of floating nuclei of government. The chaos of Russia will be repeated, and with it a decay of civilization which will render all construction hopeless for a generation. The League of Nations, if it can at all be created, will have in its hands the problem not merely of rearranging the map, but of restoring Society from the foundation upward from Prague to Bagdad, from Warsaw to Vladivostok. I have seen that kind of dissolution on a minute scale in the Balkans, and I try to imagine what a Macedonia would be like which stretched from Bohemia to Siberia. I turn away from the nightmare, wishing only that every President and Premier on this globe could be forced to smell just one burned village and to feed just a score of homeless peasant families for a week. Dismembering Austria means doing this same thing for an appreciable fraction of the inhabited earth. It means constructing a league of starving nations and drafting constitutions for homeless millions.

A federated Austria may be got within measureable time by a negotiated peace. To dismember Austria means a protraction of the war, which only the extreme nationist parties will tolerate, and they will make no League of Nations. We must choose between a geographical unsettlement and an organic resettlement. Is it a map we want or an international society? It is not enough that we should face these questions with perfect disinterestedness. There is a peril which besets the feet even of the disinterested idealist. It is the obsession of power—the conviction that he can by force, by wisdom, by character reverse history, recreate society, ignore evolution and play providence to the earth.

H. N. Brailsford.

London, July.

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The difference of opinion between Mr. Brailsford and the New Republic about the policy which the Allies ought to pursue with regard to Austria-Hungary does not originate in any divergence in political values. We believe no less than he does in the creation of a League of Nations as the major political object of the war. For the western democracies all other objectives should derive their justification and importance chiefly from their tendency to help or hinder the formation and the survival of such a League. If nothing is done at the peace conference and thereafter to bring it into existence, the western democracies will, in a political sense, have lost the war no matter how complete the military victory gained by their armies over those of Germany. This League of Nations must, if it is to survive, constitute at least the beginning of an international society; and a society, national or international, consists fundamentally in groups of people who feel the need of cooperation, whose spirit of cooperation is expressed in some measure of definite community of purpose and who, when they differ, seek to adjust their differences by discussion and investigation. A new map of Europe would be either futile or mischievous without a new society of nations. The wisdom of all the territorial changes which may or may not result from the war, must be tested chiefly by their probable effect upon subsequent social relations among nations. If they create or perpetuate permanent grievances which act as a barrier to the discussion by peoples of their differences they cannot be justified. Conference is the only living alternative to war. The future of civilization depends on the substitution of international government obtained through conference by consent for trial by battle.

Mr. Brailsford and the New Republic agree, then, in principle. The difference between us is a question of method, although it is an enormously important question of method. In his opinion the policy of dismembering Austria-Hungary, if embodied in the treaty of peace, would wreck any chance of securing the willing consent of the German people now and hereafter to the settlement. They would regard it as "an intolerable injury and an insufferable humiliation." It would, consequently, prohibit the formation of a League of Nations. In our opinion, on the contrary, the policy of emancipating the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary from the military domination of the German-Magyar block, promises to remove perhaps the greatest single barrier which exists on the European continent to the eventual formation of a League of Nations and to the substitution of conference for war as the instrument for adjusting international differences and accomplishing international reformation.

We have reached this conclusion only after prolonged hesitation and the utmost reluctance. We distrust as much as he does the chauvinism and the indifference to the rights of minorities which has usually characterized the political attitude of the minor Slavic nationalities. Their aspirations have been used by those political leaders in the Allied countries who wished to impose an essentially punitive treaty of peace on Germany and to leave her defenseless against possible future attack. Their political pretensions were absolutist in spirit and offered an apparently poor prospect that they would use sovereign independence in a spirit of international accommodation. The federal alternative to independence was persuasive. It seemed at one time to offer an opportunity of dividing Austria-Hungary from Germany. Before the war powerful forces were at work within the Dual Empire on behalf of a federal solution. Moderate opinion was restive under the prospect of as much permanent subjection to Germany as even the maintenance of the existing Empire was coming to demand, and this restiveness increased during the first two years and a half of the war. Important classes in Austria-Hungary, headed by the Emperor himself, were willing to offer large concessions to Allied liberalism and to Slavic national aspirations in order to prevent Austria-Hungary from becoming a German satrapy. For these and other reasons a federal solution which brought with it an effective measure of autonomy for the subject nationalities, seemed to offer a more effective and cheaper method of counteracting German aggression than a policy of dismemberment.

The federal solution was, however, never free from one serious ambiguity. Did it involve the possible or partial control of the federalized Empire and its foreign policy by the representatives of a Slavic majority of the population? Or would the foreign policy of the Empire and consequently its army continue to be controlled by the Austrian-Hungarian ruling classs through the existing expedient of vesting responsibility for it in the Emperor? This ambiguity persists in the memorandum on war aims, adopted by the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference, which "does not propose the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary," but which does demand for the minor Slav nationalities the opportunity of substituting if they see fit "a free federation of Danubian States for the Austro-Hungarian Empire." If the federal solution brought with it a parliament which enabled the Slavs to exercise an influence on foreign policy commensurate with their numbers, or if it did not involve the perpetuation of the existing power of the German-Magyar ruling class to force the Slavs to fight on behalf of a foreign policy about which they were never consulted, then we would prefer federalism to dismemberment.

As we understand it, however, the difference between federalism and dismemberment turns chiefly upon the agency through which is exercised this control of the foreign policy and the armed forces of the Empire. Federalism means the vesting of the hereditary kingship of all the states of the Empire in the Hapsburg family and in Hapsburg control of the foreign policy and of the national armies as a part of the Imperial and royal prerogative. If it meant anything less than that the Germans would object to federalism just as tenaciously and fiercely as they would object to dismemberment. What they want and need is the ability to compel the Austrian Slavs to fight for a foreign policy dictated from Berlin. The advantage which they have obtained and wish to perpetuate by keeping the Austria-Hungarian Empire intact is primarily military. The legal right to conscript these Slavic peoples not only insures the safety of the two Empires against any ordinary attack, but it makes of them the most formidable military force in Europe, one which is powerful enough to be used as the instrument of aggressive political purposes. As long as the German-Magyar hegemony persists in its present form, it tends to pervert every political into a military problem and to make a struggle for the Balance of Power dominate all other aspects of European politics.

Before the Russian Revolution there was a plausible reason for regarding the Dual Empire with toleration, if not with approval, in spite of its injustice to the Slavs and its alliance with Germany. Autocratic Russia, with its uneasy ambitions and its hordes of conscript soldiers, constituted a military danger, against which any prudent German statesman would be justified in erecting the most formidable possible military safeguard. If the war had

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terminated in 1916 with the result of placing the Russian autocracy in political control not only of Poland, but of Constantinople, an enlarged Rumania, an emancipated Bohemia, and a renewed Jugo-Slavia, the German peoples would have been left practically defenseless. They would have been justified in doing what they could to avoid such a consummation or to overthrow it. But the Russian Revolution, resulting as it has in republicanizing and disintegrating the older Russia, has done away with the threat from which the Germans suffered and the excuse for counteracting it by insisting on the military control of 30,000,000 Slavs. The most serious obstacle to the substitution of political for military considerations in rearranging the distribution of military and political power in Central Europe has been removed. The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary will no longer involve the automatic aggrandizement of Black Russia. Neither will it involve any necessary or considerable insecurity for the German people. The danger of a Pan-Slav combination subordinated to the influence of a military autocracy has passed. The difficulty has now more than ever become that of protecting the disorganized Slavs against the power and the designs of their powerful, united and determined German and Hungarian neighbors.

It may be answered that German statesmanship has the future to consider. It must insist upon military control over the Austrian Slavs, because it cannot count upon the continued inoffensiveness of the huge mass of the Russian people. The answer is discredited by recent German policy in the East. That policy betrays, not the fear of being subjugated by the Slavs but a plain resolution to increase their subjugation. It was not designed to win the friendship or perpetuate the existence of an inoffensive Russian republic or to suggest a durable and equitable settlement of the national and racial problems of Central Europe or to promote the peace and security of the world. On the contrary, German statesmanship wrote a treaty which offered the Russian people a choice between subjection to German domination or a long process of national recovery and resistance which at the end might make the Russian masses more dangerous because better organized and more aggressive than they had been under the Tsar. It deliberately took advantage of the helplessness, the revolutionary disorganization and the political incompetence and credulity of the new Russia in order to begin the subjugation of the Lithuanians, the Poles and the Little Russians much as the Austrian-Hungarian combination had already subjugated the Bohemians and the Jugo-Slavs.

Germany's policy in Russia is clearly the blood relative of the Austro-Hungarian policy towards its subject nationalities. It has justified the western democracies in associating the liberation of the border provinces from Germany with the liberation of the Czechs and the Croats from Austria-Hungary. It is no longer a question of tolerating the Hapsburg Empire as a dubious but excusable agency for the protection of German civilization against a threatening Pan-Slavism. Rather has it become a question of breaking up the Austrian Empire as a means of protecting the Slavs against a frank and preponderant Pan-Germanism. The Germans have erected their Eastern policy into an impassable barrier against the organization of a League of Nations, and in doing so they have only applied to the situation on their own border the principles underlying the Austrian Empire. By consenting to the Brest-Litovsk treaties, the Hapsburg Emperor Charles sealed the bond of subjection of his own dynasty to Pan-Germanism, committed himself finally to a policy of frustrating Slavic national aspirations and accepted the German army as the mainstay of the Austrian Empire against Slavic insurrection.

He had sought, it is true, to escape from such a complete surrender of his independence, but circumstances were too much for him. Allied diplomacy offered him no sufficient support in his effort to regain his freedom of political action. But it is questionable how far such freedom was possible. Dubious as the behavior of Allied diplomacy was in the Prince Sixtus negotiations, its failure was the not unnatural result of the actual facts of Austria-Hungary's position with respect to Germany. The war would never have occurred had not German statesmen feared for the future of German influence in the Dual Empire. For this reason they either instigated or supported the fatal ultimatum to Serbia. Their only remaining chance of winning the war depends upon completing the conquest of their ally and upon the legal right to give wider application to the principle on which the Dual Empire rests. Surely the answer on the part of the western democracies is to support those minor Slavic nationalities in Austria-Hungary whose development would be frustrated by German success.

We are fully alive to the dangers and penalties of the adoption of such a policy. It will prolong the war and necessitate a larger measure of military victory before Germany will negotiate. Moderate Germans will for the present consider the imposition of such terms as insufferable and will resent them bitterly. If this resentment continues the peace of the world will be rendered insecure, and instead of a League of Nations we shall have a war after the war. But the alternative policy brings with it more injustice and no less insecurity. Now that the issue has been so sharply raised by Germany, how can Allied statesmanship consent to the perpetuation of the existing German-Hungarian political domination of the minor Slav nationalities? It is precisely the kind of oppression which the Germans are perpetrating against the Slavs, which is the most frequent and most irresistible cause of international unrest. No form of autonomy or federation under Hapsburg leadership which has yet been suggested will remove the cause of this unrest. It cannot be removed except by putting an end to a system which gives the German-Hungarian combination the legal right to force the Slavs to fight on behalf of a foreign policy over which they are not allowed to exercise any control. As long as any of the great states live by the exercise of this right, a League of Nations which included such a state would pay the same price for its inclusion as the American Union paid for the inclusion of slave states. An international league, if it is to survive, must provide particular peoples with the opportunity of self-development, secured by legal sanction. Is there any more drastic and intolerable way of balking national self-development than that of authorizing a ruling class or race to force subject peoples to fight against their will for a foreign policy which, in so far as it was successful, would confirm their subjugation?

But the war aim of dismembering Austria-Hungary would, according to Mr. Brailsford, have the intolerable result of redrawing the map of Europe on the lines of secret treaties, and this result would take place in spite of anything which the President could do to prevent it. Here again does he not fail to calculate sufficiently on the effect of the Russian revolution in altering the balance of political and economic forces? The execution of those treaties depended ultimately on the victorious and preponderant military force of autocratic Russia. That military force has ceased to exist. The only force which has taken its place is American economic and military power. If the Allies secure a military victory decisive enough to dismember the

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Dual Empire, they must depend on the American army to do the job. Suppose, then, that they used a victory won chiefly by American troops in order to put into effect treaties which violate the spirit and letter of the President's war programme. The President would, it is true, have no retort except that of withdrawing from a European system which rested on a basis of violence and injustice, but why should the retort be as ineffective as Mr. Brailsford insists? A victory won by American power will need American power to secure its fruits. Italy and France may not want a League of Nations, but they will want the security for a settlement of the war favorable to themselves which only a League of Nations can give. If America resumes her isolation and refuses to assume any responsibility for a new European system which, no matter how much the map is changed, restores the status quo ante of an unscrupulous competition for power, the settlement will have small chance of enduring for more than a few years.

Those Allied statesmen who are so willing to dispense with the idea of a League of Nations during the war will not be equally obdurate when it comes to writing a peace. If they are they will be superseded. In the absence of a powerful Russian army they will not dare to propose an Eastern settlement which, like that defined in the secret treaties, must rest on force rather than on consent. They cannot exert the force which the perpetuation of such a system would require. Their only chance of counteracting the existing preponderance of force which the Germans are capable of exerting in relation to all near Eastern political questions is to propose a solution which could be guaranteed by a League of Nations, and which would embody an honest effort to satisfy and to reconcile the complicated political and economic needs of that region. A solution of this kind would demand the union, so far as possible, of the Czecho-Slovaks, the Jugo-Slavs, the Poles, the Rumanians, the Hungarians and the Bulgarians under one political authority. It would demand a constitution which would protect the national culture of those minorities whom it would not be geographically possible to unite politically with their fellow nationals. Finally it would demand a federal organization which would facilitate inter-state commerce and provide for military defense. If the new states were incapable of federating they could not preserve their independence for long, and it would be the general apprehension of this danger which would supply a strong motive for bringing federation into existence and trying to make it work. If such a federation could be formed it would have every advantage over a federation under Hapsburg leadership except that of tradition. For it would mean the satisfaction of national aspirations instead of their frustration. A Danubian federation which provided a place for the principle of national self-determination could endure. A federation under Hapsburg control which violated that principle would not endure.

There remains the no less formidable difficulty of the German resentment which the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary must provoke. Will this resentment erect, as Mr. Brailsford believes, an impassable obstacle to the organization of a League of Nations? The answer to this question will depend upon the extent to which the resentment is justified by the actual harm which the German people will suffer as a consequence of dismemberment. The "subjective" test which Mr. Brailsford applies is not sufficient. Domineering people who convince themselves of the righteousness of some unrighteous but profitable institution or practice always resent it when they are forced to reform, but if the reform is justified their resentment disappears and communication is ultimately resumed. In this particular case we are unable to understand why German resentment should prevent the Allies from seeking to right a wrong which is so closely connected with the origin of the war and upon whose perpetuation and development the Germans base their remaining hopes of victory.

Neither can we understand how any "true conference" can take place among the belligerents as long as either Germany or Austria will not abandon the right to force the Slavic peoples to fight on behalf of German Imperialism. A conference is profitable in so far as the conferees are ready to reach an adjustment of their differences based on a joint definition of purpose and an agreement as to what the pertinent facts are. The Germans are not ready to accept those principles which a League of Nations must embody or fail. They are not willing to substitute a politics of consent for a politics of power, and there can be no better proof of this than the importance which they attach to the right to conscript the Austrian Slavs. The exercise of that right is a peculiarly flagrant example of the very Machtpolitik which a League of Nations must destroy in order to live. As long as the Germans insist upon it, there can be no meeting of minds, no mutual confidence, no conference that would result in anything but unprincipled compromise. If the League of Nations is to endure it cannot begin by sacrificing justice to peace, particularly in a matter which penetrates to the heart of the problem of a European international concert.

The most serious objection to insisting on the dismemberment of Austro-Hungary is not the penalty of German resentment, for if the resentment is not justified it will eventually fade away. It is the danger of a possible abuse on the French front or in Asia or Africa of the measure of military victory without which dismemberment can not be brought about. In so far as victory is so abused, all the consequences predicted by Mr. Brailsford will follow, and there will be a real danger of abuse unless the Allies agree upon and publish a joint statement of war aims similar to that of the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference. But we have to deal with our difficulties in the order of their relative imminence and importance. Just at present the most important business of the Allies is not only to defeat the clearly aggressive purpose for which the Germans are fighting, but so far as possible to dry up the sources of their aggression. The Allies will not succeed as the automatic result of military victory in doing away with the international anarchy which makes for war, but by emancipating the Austrian Slavs they can put an end to the irresistible temptation of the German-Hungarian combination to play power politics. That is an obstacle to a society of nations which a military victory can remove, and which nothing but a military victory or a successful revolution can remove. The other danger of a vindictive treaty of peace which would perpetuate instead of undermining the politics of force will remain to be dealt with when it actually arises.

We do not place a low estimate on the seriousness of this danger. But on Mr. Brailsford's solution the human motives behind it would persist and obtain a different expression. The abuse by the Allies of military victory is not the only way of perpetuating the politics of force. Those individuals and classes in all the belligerent countries that profit by Machtpolitik will do their best in any event to keep war alive after the fighting is over. Whatever the outcome democrats will have to contend with all their resources against the determination of these Machtpolitiker to deprive the peoples of the world of the liberation from militarism which they crave as the result

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of their colossal sufferings. In our opinion democrats will enjoy a better opportunity of winning their fight, in case they can manage as one of the aims of the war to free the Slavic peoples of Central Europe from German political and military domination. The achievement would in itself tend to release and invigorate the democratic movement throughout the world. It would deprive the exponents of power politics of the most effective arguments in favor of large armaments and a foreign policy which tried to counteract fear by aggression.

The "true conference," in which alone, as Mr. Brailsford says, a durable League of Nations will originate, can hardly take place until after the fight between democratic and power politics has taken place in the several belligerent countries, and the democrats have won some measure of victory. The best we shall probably get out of the peace conference is the beginning of a League of Free Nations, which the Junkers all over the world will resolve to destroy and the democrats to confirm and develop. Democrats, if they want their society of nations, must win their domestic conflict, and when it is won call the nations together and enter into a "true conference"—one in which the nations and classes represented will not be seeking to take advantage of each other or of the masses, but will be honestly trying to work out a basis of human cooperation. We hope and believe such a conference will eventually be called, but that the delegates which the existing governments will appoint to discuss terms of peace will live up to any such specifications is, we feel sure, "as pathetic and baseless" an illusion as any idealist can cherish. They may and probably will be forced to build an informal and temporary fore-court through which the nations will eventually enter into their international mansion, but the mansion itself will have to wait until some of the bitterness of the war is tempered and until the Prussians within the gates are defeated. Let us not, then, sacrifice too much in order to obtain a quick conference in the vain hope that it will be a "true" conference. There can be no "true" conference until the power politicians who control so many existing governments are superseded, and that will not take place during war. Only the processes of peace will enable men to restore to the world the needed opportunity to realize their longings for freedom, justice and truth. But let us be sure that peace means pacification—that it deals in a thoroughgoing way with the issue as to the hegemony in Central Europe raised by the immediate outbreak of the war and emphasized by its whole military and political development.

THE EDITORS.

CORRESPONDENCE

Bursting with Liberty

SIR: The two articles that have appeared in the New Republic, An Independent College of Social Science and, what seems to be an ancillary discourse, Social Science and Culture, seem to me to evince a depressing sense of complacency. I cannot but feel that such ideas applied to any institution of learning would produce a place of doctrinaires only and vocationalists. Ex pede Herculem.

I question if a school without an administrative system would be possible. Surely men who have succeeded in the world of affairs ought to know best, also how to conduct, through a president and dean and committees, the running of a college; better surely than a group of specialists in mere learning. And under the scheme proposed for the new so-called college, what would become of those rewards for the students' labors and those time-hallowed incitements to noble endeavor that are represented by grades and prizes and honors? Would Phi Beta Kappa grant such an institution a charter for a chapter? Hardly. I am reminded of Aristotle's remark about that charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, where the ass thinks himself as good as the rider, the pupil as the master, everything being about to burst with liberty.

Furthermore, the classical arrangement is needed for discipline. I admit the enthusiasm of certain present-day students for semi-journalistic and contemporaneous subjects, such as economics or modern literature. But there is undoubtedly a falling off in study for its own sake.

And how are these students when they come to write of their subject matter to possess any style? I have long observed that some journalists have a striking vocabulary, considering that they have had no university training; but, after all, the style is truly the man, as Buffon pointed out; and the philosopher Locke says that there are many sorts of men. There is no branch of study so suitable as the classical is to attain to the clearness of style which is necessary in so many ways to secure the meanings of authors to be as clear as they need.

And, worst of all, I believe that students working in such an unadministrated institution and in such a limited demesne would inevitably be filled with that unrest which threatens our incoming generations; class hatred, vulgar subject matter, sensational and crude detail, and violations of taste and standard. How far, indeed, would a public servant evolved from such a school be from a man like Gladstone, for example, who, under the benefits of a sound cultural training and the influence of the Christian womanhood of his queen, wrought so nobly to preserve the sobriety and dignity of the social order.

Perhaps we of the traditional order, confronted with this new scheme, will have to say—if I may be permitted a bit of levity by way of conclusion—with the old man in Plautus, translating the passage into our familiar idiom: "To the extent to which my age permits and as there arises occasion to do so, I will push on my steps and hasten to get along. But how far away from easy 'tis for me I am not mistaken as to that."

But I am of those who are far from convinced of such a change in education.

ACADEMICUS.

Providence, Rhode Island.

Insignia for the Rejected

SIR: Having heard of your reputation of taking up through your pages any case where right or justice has been denied, I would like to call your attention to the case of our boys who are anxious and willing to enlist in the service of their country, but have been rejected.

They are being subjected daily to mortification and humiliation, and are being mistaken and reproached as slackers by those who do not understand their position.

Should they not have some insignia to show that they have offered their lives, as well as their more fortunate companions who have been accepted? To relegate them to war work in airplane factories with old men and slackers, with no recognition, rank or uniform tends to break the boys' spirit and is a loss to the country.

A DISHEARTENED PATRIOT.

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Books and Things

IN 1886 the Encyclopædia Britannica, ninth edition, said of Charlotte Brontë: "A comparison has sometimes been made between Miss Brontë and Miss Austen. The points of contrast are certainly more apparent than the points of similarity; and it is a fact not without significance that Miss Brontë could never thoroughly appreciate the merits of her great predecessor. Both were consummate masters of literary expression, and both finished their work with the utmost care and precision."

Nonsense, we say of 1886 in 1918, when even the meanest of God's creatures is aware that Miss Austen's and Miss Brontë's "points of similarity" are exactly three: both were women, both wrote novels, the novels of both were published in the nineteenth century. Their "points of contrast" are all the differences between the world of high comedy and the world of passion and of stormy landscape. Nothing could be more apparent and less important than both difference and similarity. Miss Brontë's inability to appreciate Miss Austen is a fact without significance. What she said of Miss Austen, whom she disesteemed, is not so wide of the mark as what she said of Thackeray, whom she admired. She deemed Thackeray's "an intellect profounder and more unique than his contemporaries have yet recognized," she regarded him as "the first social regenerator of the day," she said "he resembles Fielding as an eagle does a vulture." Her literary opinions are worth recalling only because they count so little in the total impression that she leaves, only because the same woman who could write of Thackeray so strangely could study his face, in an engraving sent her by Mr. George Smith, and make a good guess at his character.

Charlotte Brontë, as we all agree now, was an in-and-outer. She had her terrible off days. She could be innocently guilty of the Blanche Ingram scenes in Jane Eyre. When "punch" was her goal she could write like this: "Up the blood rushed to his face; forth flashed the fire from his eyes; erect he sprang; he held his arms out [shouldn't it have been "out he held his arms" or "out his arms he held"?]; but I evaded his embrace, and at once quitted the room." What do these things matter? Could she not also say, when in an infrequent mood of delicate fancy, and when "a splendid midsummer shone over England," that "it was as if a band of Italian days had come from the south, like a flock of glorious passenger birds, and lighted to rest them on the cliffs. . . ."?

One likes to remember the passage in which Mrs. Gaskell tells of her visit to Haworth parsonage in 1853, the year before Miss Brontë's marriage: "But now to return to our quiet hour of rest after dinner. I soon observed that her habits of order were such that she could not go on with the conversation if a chair were out of place; everything was arranged with delicate regularity." And it is this orderly spinster who makes Jane Eyre, not long after her "thin crescent-destiny" has begun to enlarge, speak of "that something which used to make me fear and shrink, as if I had been wandering amongst volcanic-looking hills, and had suddenly felt the ground quiver, and seen it gape." A misplaced chair put her out, and her imagination was at home upon volcanic-looking hills! How did this imagination work its miracles? She has told us as much as she could tell. Mrs. Gaskell, surprised by the vividness with which the effects of opium are described in Villette, asked whether she had ever taken opium. Charlotte "replied that she had never, to her knowledge, taken a grain of it in any shape, but that she had followed the process she always adopted when she had to describe anything that had not fallen within her own experience; she had thought intently on it for many and many a night before falling asleep—wondering what it was like, or how it would be—till at length, sometimes after her story had been arrested at this point for weeks, she wakened up in the morning with all clear before her, as if she had in reality gone through the experience, and then could describe it, word for word, as it happened." A flawed artist, no doubt, but one whose enormities, whose occasional magniloquence and unrealities and atrocious phrases, do not spoil our interest in her story, or keep us from seeing that her hatred of "tame, vacant life" was without flaw, that her books are an honest and often a splendid hymn in praise of the "good, true, vigorous" passion that strikes its roots deep and lives long. And let us not forget, however often people may bore us by repeating it, that she was a great innovator. She discovered the plain heroine. She discovered the frank heroine who sometimes told her love. In English fiction wasn't she one of the two pioneers in whose work we find the first impassioned rendering of the modern intimacy between man and landscape? As for Sir Walter Scott and Mrs. Radcliffe, much as their men and women observe and enjoy landscape, he did not try for and she did not achieve the degree of intimacy which is so high and so modern in the Brontës.

The other pioneer was Emily Brontë, born a hundred years ago, two years after Charlotte. Mrs. Gaskell's life revealed Charlotte Brontë, and since it appeared several hundred letters have been published. They better our acquaintance with Charlotte. In the letters to Miss Nussey we can learn, almost week by week, her first, second, third, fourth impressions of the Reverend Arthur Bell Nicholls, her father's curate, whom she was afterward to marry and love. Mrs. Gaskell told us ever so much less about Emily, and this little is still almost all that we know. Her published letters are still only two. Mme. Duclaux has added one unforgettable picture of Emily's dying. A hundred and thirty-eight poems, more than half of them discovered by Mr. Clement Shorter, have come to light. But of new material that is mere information we have next to nothing. It is not by any satisfactions of curiosity that her fame has grown. She is still as remote and unknowable as she was when alive.

This inaccessibility has helped her fame. Her eulogists have helped it. The impression made by Matthew Arnold's praise and by Swinburne's deepens all the time. M. Maeterlinck has added to theirs his own more penetrating and more curious praise. Miss May Sinclair has destroyed many myths in The Three Brontës, a delightful witty book, rich in insight and contagious generosities, though here and there a little fanciful, and mostly pitched in too high a key. With the newly discovered poems as a guide Miss Sinclair has mounted the stream and visited the springs of Emily's imagination. And yet, when we speak of Emily, the best we can do with any certitude is to repeat what Matthew Arnold wrote, that her "soul knew no fellow for might, passion, vehemence, grief, daring, since Byron died." She belonged, as do Catherine Earnshaw and Heathcliff, to "the true aristocracy of passionate souls," and the passion in all three has a depth and reach and integrity far beyond Byron's. Her genius, austere, intense, mystical, made Wuthering Heights like a piece of granite that surprisingly grows, twisted and glowing, out on the moors that she loved with all her solitary heart, and where the high winds put the last touch to her isolation.

P. L.

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Rewards, Penalties and Plato

Platonism, by Paul Elmer More. Princeton University Press. $1.75.

THROUGH the storms of centuries the philosophy of Plato has stood out as a beacon by the light of which all kinds of mariners—mystics, sceptics, theologians, mathematicians, communists, eugenists—have steered their diverse courses. But men are not as a rule satisfied with the light and the vision of beauty which minds like Plato radiate in all directions. They must claim exclusive ownership. Hence different schools and sects all endeavor to annex Plato as one of their own. Mr. More tries to make of Plato an orthodox Calvinistic moralist. I do not mean to accuse Mr. More of wilfulness. He has read Plato long and carefully—more carefully than the hasty reader can well appreciate. But, as Xenophanes remarked twenty-five centuries ago, men always make their gods in their own image, the Greeks like Greeks, the Ethiopians like Ethiopians. Does not Milton make the Lord argue like a theologic logician, of the school of Peter Ramus? And does not Renan make Christ a sympathetic but disillusioned romanticist?—while Tolstoi paints him as a non-resisting Russian peasant. It is therefore quite natural that Mr. More, apparently more interested in Calvinistic theology than in Greek life and science, should represent Plato as a somewhat softened and more urbane Jonathan Edwards. No account, however, of Plato can be historically accurate which considers Plato's ethics entirely apart from any of the conditions of Greek life, which considers Plato's theory of art, education and politics as merely "subsidiary," which entirely rejects the light on Plato thrown by his great successors, and deliberately ignores Plato's relation to the mathematical philosophy of the Pythagoreans. Did not Plato inscribe over the portals of his academy "Let none ignorant of geometry enter here"? Historical accuracy, to be sure, may be a secondary matter. The value of a man's view of life may be independent of the historical peg on which he hangs it, but surely it is a pity that an accomplished literary critic like Mr. More should fall a victim to the ruthless temper of philosophic controversy, and treat the dialogues of Plato not as works of art to be admired like the statuary of Praxiteles, but as clubs with which to hit the heads of contemporary philosophers who have a little more sympathy with the frail throbbing flesh that enters into our human nature.

Mr. More's own philosophy, which underlies his Shelburne Essays and comes to clearer light in this book, deserves greater attention than it has generally been accorded. It is true, as Mr. More with admirable courage admits, that the current of the day is against it. But it is still most powerfully entrenched. Its conception of morality is still taught in all our Sunday and week-day schools, and in most of our colleges. Its basic distrust of man's natural impulses still dominates our legal if not our theologic thought—since the framers of our national constitution of checks and balances were thoroughly imbued with Calvinism. If, then, this philosophy is losing ground among intellectual men, it is of some importance to know why. Mr. More himself does not suggest any adequate cause for this general falling away from grace; but the history of Calvinism in Europe, as well as in this country, makes it clear that its decay was due to the fact that it could not stand the light of that mode of thought which we call modern science, but which has its roots in ancient Greece. The spirit of free inquiry has no room for that reliance on and craving for "authority higher than reason" which is at the heart of Mr. More's whole effort.

Mr. More, it is true, begins by recognizing scepticism as one of the sources of philosophy. However, the manner in which he attempts to refute hedonism, his dislike of the term "probable," and the ready way in which he falls back on unproved dogmatic assertions ("spiritual affirmations") show how far Mr. More is from the robust scepticism of science. It is true, of course, that absolute suspension of all judgment is unattainable, that we are all forced by the demands of life to make some affirmation or choice. But this only proves that our knowledge is not always adequate for action, that life consists largely of hazardous leaps in the dark. Scientific honesty, however, makes us admit that where demonstrative knowledge ends only guessing begins. The fact that we *must* guess does not prove our guess true. Our brief lives are but momentary gleams between two eternities of total darkness, and we can gather but little as to the unknown and tempestuous seas of being wherein we find ourselves tossed. Only a little of the structure of our frail boats and something of the waters immediately about us is revealed by science. For the most part we must sail into the unknown without any absolute guarantee of safety. Mr. More has the right to stake his life on his own guess. He might, if he had chosen, have sought to show that in the light of history and science other boats are more likely to be shipwrecked than his own. But anyone who stands up and says, My spiritual affirmation is *the* truth because I have an "invincible assurance," shows a pathetic confusion between knowledge and guesswork. The resorting to epithets, the calling of our own guess "superrational intuition" and the guess of others piggish or "emanating from a plane below the reason," is a pitiable display of intellectual impotence, just as the poor pedagogue stamps and raises the voice of authority when he cannot give a satisfactory explanation. Even as a consolation these epithets are rather thin, since our opponents are always free to return the service in kind.

Though Mr. More is not an academic philosopher and writes with the easy grace and correctness characteristic of the courtly manner, the substance of his book is concerned with that most academic question, the rewards and penalties of the moral life. He will not question the view that the universe must be conceived like a Sunday school or penitentiary, where none of us would be "good" or moral unless we were promised some reward or threatened with punishment. Now there are few doctrines so intellectually dishonest as doctrines concerning the rewards and punishments of the moral life. They may be well-intentioned people who say that virtue always leads to success and vice to misery. But it is an obvious and monstrous falsehood in a world where we profit by the good deeds of our parents and where millions are suffering unutterable tortures because of the deeds of foreign potentates. That those who suffer must have been wicked, and that those who triumph must have been virtuous, is one of the most inhuman beliefs in history. As to the doctrine that the reward of virtue is to be found in a clear conscience or high satisfaction—that is an even more violent falsehood. The people who suffer most from their conscience are obviously the sensitive and high-minded, while self-approbation comes most easily to the complacent and fortune-favored Jack Horners. The doctrine that the reward of moral life is a *feeling* of satisfaction or happiness (pages 74, 80, 89, 90, 116, etc.) is not only contrary to moral experience, but is intellectually sterile. The natural variation of individual feeling leaves us without any means whereby to tell what *is* the good or

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the moral. Indeed, though Mr. More constantly speaks of justice as the good, he never makes any attempt to tell us how to determine what is just. How can one possibly determine the justice of a labor dispute or the just claims of Ireland to self-government by means of conscience or his feeling of happiness?

It is indeed a sad irony of fate to find in a book on Plato the subjectivist doctrine that the reward of the moral life is to be found in a feeling. Did not Plato write the Republic to show that the problem of morality or justice is not soluble unless we tackle it in terms of social organization? It seems a fact that modern subjectivistic or "conscience" theories of morality confine themselves to certain personal virtues and leave the larger questions of social morality either untouched or subject to external authority. But to do so is simply to perpetuate the prevailing standard based on past experience, ignorance and prejudice. To make morality always synonymous with the maintenance of the status quo is indeed to commit the great treason against the intellectual life and to make philosophy procuress to the lords of hell.

The nearest Mr. More comes to throwing light on the concrete problems of the moral life is in his insistence that all true moralists or Platonists say No to our natural impulses. Taken literally and absolutely, this is arrant nonsense. Moral life would be impossible without generous impulses. But I suppose Mr. More simply wishes to insist on the eternal necessity of discipline and self-control. But even this, it seems to me, cannot be set up as the supreme good of life. The temptation of the flesh, like the instinct of the moth, may lead us straight into the flame; but it does not follow that it is worth while to struggle pitiably for the preservation of an existence devoid of all warmth and light. Discipline and self-control are undoubtedly great goods. Without self-restraint there can be no mastery, no worthy achievement. But to make self-control the end of life is as absurd as the position of those who would make good administration or the saving of money the end of government. People do not grow rich by mere saving, and self-control is not worth a farthing unless we build up a great self worth controlling. It is the merit of genuine philosophies that they paint for us some great object with which we can identify ourselves and thus make us worth while. Mr. More's negative song in the minor scale does not do so.

Mr. More has written a serious book hoping to touch the minds of a few of our generous college youth. In this I think there is little likelihood of his being very successful. The minds of youth cannot be stirred by eternal don'ts and warnings against the temptations of the flesh. Some great positive and generous faith, some great outlook on life, is necessary to arouse their energies. Historical Calvinism was effective, not because it preached restraints and supported them with the fear of hell, but because it gave men a vision of the glory of God. Mr. More's philosophy may not unfairly be called Calvinism without the glory of God. If the history of religion has any teaching, it is that the glory of God is not visible except to those who are profoundly moved by compassion for their fellow men.

This review of a scholarly and charmingly written book is probably somewhat unfair, perhaps grossly so; but if so it is not from any bias in favor of those against whom Mr. More is battling. I share Mr. More's distrust of vague beliefs in social service and "benumbing trust in mechanical progress," and above all I share his aversion for sentimental romanticism. But all of us have the defects of our qualities, and Mr. More's philosophy illustrates the danger of intellectual anaemia which threatens all closet philosophers. We must, to be sure, get out of the tumult of the market place to gather our thoughts. But if we get up too high on the mountain or stay there too long, our thoughts lose the substance and the strength which comes from immediate contact with the brute facts. The recovery of the Greek world, and of Plato in particular, meant to the modern world liberation from the mediaeval dogma that nature is sin and intellect the devil. This liberation, however, has never been completed. The rationalists wish us to recover reason, but they lose contact with nature. The romanticists wish us to recover nature, but alas, they lose contact with reason. The significance of modern science is that it is an organized attempt to keep reason wedded to the facts of nature. And no one can adequately interpret life or Plato who does not avail himself of its help.

PHILONOUS.

Human Nature in Industry

The Works Manager Today, by Sidney Webb. New York: Longmans Green & Co. $1.00.

Welfare Work, by E. Dorothea Proud. London: G. S. Bell & Sons. $2.00.

IF, as Mr. Graham Wallas has suggested, The Town Labourer is a model piece of research writing, The Works Manager Today is a model of what effective propaganda among employers should be. And Miss Proud's Welfare Work, despite the introductory acclamations of Mr. Lloyd George that her book "bids fair to become the standard work on the subject," is an example of what to avoid. Steering a moderate course between the too-easy and predigested pabulum with which American employers have been fed in periodicals like Factory and System and his own more formidable interpretation of Industrial Democracy, Mr. Webb has produced a short, incisive and wise book on the relation of management to men. For the present his volume will stand as the best single exposition of the new humanism in industry. And Miss Proud, fresh from a reading of the Factory Reports, leads us through a maze of anecdote and illustrative matter arranged with no discoverable logic, to some conclusions which she shares with Mr. Webb and to others about which she is herself in doubt. The one is the book of a cogent analyst and realist; the other is the collected notes of a conscientious but befuddled investigator.

Fundamentally there is only one serious point of difference between Mr. Webb and Miss Proud. He is clear that professional managers are "charged with a distinct function which all of you have in common, . . . namely, the function of handling human nature in conjunction with machinery and materials with a view to its perfect cooperation in an industrial enterprise." "The function of management, which is needed as soon as two or three are gathered together in a common task is recognized as indispensable when we come to enterprises in which numbers are engaged." But to Miss Proud no such clear issue presents itself. No further realignment of functions appears necessary to her than is represented by the selection of a "welfare secretary" of indeterminate powers and influence, who while presumably removing from the manager a part of his irksome task of understanding human nature, must still give way to him when his "practical" knowledge is at odds with the secretary's humane impulses

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"One of the most important duties of a Welfare Secretary," says Miss Proud, "may be to watch the effects of any modification attempted by the employer and to advise him in respect to them. But in many cases so-called Welfare Secretaries are not allowed any voice in discussions about wages. The whole question presents great difficulty. If the Welfare Department is 'the conscience of the factory,' the situation is apt to be strained when the conscience becomes really troublesome."

Here we see the whole issue clearly joined. Are the human considerations to have determining weight in the management or are they to have merely the force of interjected, unwelcome and timidly advanced advice? Is the labor problem a central one for which the management itself should assume full responsibility and come to expert competence? Or is the administration of relations with employees an accessory, a luxury and a fad to be left to well-intentioned but unconvincing welfare secretaries so long as these placate and soothe the workers and to be rudely snatched from them when wages or other important questions are causing dispute?

Clearly Mr. Webb's answer is in the direction of the best experience and the soundest common sense. His dictum: "What the management has principally to handle . . is . . human nature [and] will," sets the face of the new generation of executives toward the key problem of Twentieth century industry. And only as this problem is faced and taken in hand by the top men will factory affairs show any tendency to come out of the muddle into which they are cast by the present division of control and power over the "personnel" policies and practices. Assuming then, with Mr. Webb, that personnel management is a staff function comparable to the sales, financial and producing functions, we can then proceed as both books do proceed without regard to their differences over administration, to discuss the technique of "voluntary efforts on the part of employers to improve, within the existing industrial system, the conditions of employment in their own factories."

As evidencing a new understanding of the elements and factors which influence the attitude and efficiency of the workers, both books are hopeful indices. Since this understanding is the preliminary condition of the reorganization of shop methods, the inclusion in the discussion of every item from lunch rooms to trade unionism marks a distinct step ahead. Not that either book offers a complete list of factors which can determine for good or ill the attitude of men toward management; but between the two a fairly satisfactory impression is to be gained of the complexity of the problem. Miss Proud emphasizes the more immediately material aspects of industrial relations. She discusses doctors, nurses, vacation homes, recreation clubs, lunch rooms, baths, gymnasia, housing, factory schools, libraries, insurance and a thousand other activities which she has found in one or another English factory. But because of restrictions she has set upon herself, or perhaps because she has not made up her mind, Miss Proud does not consider the relative value of these multifarious activities in doing the one thing needful—namely, helping to maintain self-respecting and progressively sound industrial relations.

Mr. Webb, on the other hand, considers more convincingly a different set of problems, because in his thoroughly mature approach to the subject he knows the truly vital items in the labor contract. He discusses "appointments and dismissals," "the recognition of trade unionism," "the standard rate," "the manners of management," discipline, scientific management and so forth. He shows with complete lucidity how and in what ways managerial ineptitudes of all those problems clog the industrial machine and raise up barriers, physiological and psychological, in the way of more wholesome and amicable operation. And his estimates gain weight and validity because they are made in relation to two touchstones—"human nature" and "efficiency." It is the absence of these, or any other similar criteria by which it can evaluate the welfare proposals it discusses, which constitutes the major limitation of Miss Proud's book. There still remains, therefore, the serious task of analyzing with complete thoroughness the items, material and psychological, which exert a modifying influence upon workers' relation to their work. These two books make a beginning, but neither is an inductive study with this enumeration as its primary purpose. Both, nevertheless, furnish a sound point of departure for such study. For both are also cognizant in a general way at least of the inevitable relation of sound management to a knowledge of human nature.

Happily this dependence upon an understanding of human nature carries with it a sense for the more modern "behavioristic" conception of human beings rather than for some subjective or utilitarian notion of human nature. The recurrence of words like "happiness" and "personality" marks an effort to see the industrial struggle in personal and intimate terms. Both books are dominated by the assumption that each human being is an end in himself and is not to be construed as the means toward the fulfillment of other people's plans or abstruse ideals. Both books assume that we are on the way to a fairly accurate knowledge of the essential character of human beings. This new and more generous sense of the real nature of

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people is for example responsible for the following practical hint thrown out by the author of Welfare Work: "In such matters," she says, "as the prevention of petty theft within a factory, much might be accomplished. Instead of employees being liable to be searched on leaving the premises, and demanding that 'searching' be carried out 'in the firm's time,' it might be possible by a diffusion of responsibility to prevent theft, rather than to punish it." Particularly does Mr. Webb's book have an insistence upon the original nature of man which is new in his writings. Of profiteering he says that it is now seen by economists to be, "because of the bad psychological reactions that it creates, in the long run, incompatible with maximum production." We shall not manage—human nature being what it is—to get the maximum production possible until we are wise enough, and well-mannered enough, in the words of Menander, to "choose equality." To be sure, neither writer has examined carefully all the implications of accepting the human-nature criterion of institutions and activities. Neither writer has a clear idea of the types of behavior and response which the psychologist has taught us to look for under the various circumstances of life. And by neither has the idea been applied from the realm of psychoanalytical psychology that repression of human impulses and desires leads to abnormal states of mind and to activities which cannot be corrected short of a more thorough expression of a conscious redirection of pent-up energies.

The reader, nevertheless, comes away from these books with a new regard for personality and for the necessity of considering proposals less in relation to "justice" or a narrowly conceived "efficiency" than to our growing knowledge about man's native endowments and equipment. For this purpose, therefore, these studies—and more especially Mr. Webb's—may well serve as primers for a psychological interpretation of the successful control of industrial relations.

On one point alone will the hints which this elementary psychological approach to labor problems suggests be likely to lead astray. They may lead managers to assume a too static view of the workers' mind and will. While Mr. Webb says distinctly in his last chapter that there will be no diminution of industrial unrest until the profit system is replaced, he does not underscore the point. Miss Proud ignores it altogether. Yet the practical bearing of the idea is obvious. If employers set out to correct bad conditions and improve the terms of the labor contract, they are doomed to discouraging results in point of employees' interest and cooperation, unless they recognize that—human nature being what it is—the workers will want progressively to share in, and perhaps soon to usurp, control. Carried through to the end our human nature criterion will reveal a will to more and more power on the part of the workers which will manifest itself as rapidly as all the surrounding conditions warrant. And laudable and desirable as they will be, efforts to construct rest rooms or even to pay the standard rate or to adopt a six hour day, will bring the employers no nearer to that stabilized and untroubled industrial régime for which they think they are desirous. And books, like these two, addressed to employers, should make that point plain. Only on the assumption by employers as well as workers that ours is a dynamic and evolving economic system can advice about the labor problem be soundly given—or intelligently applied. The objection will be raised that neither of these books pretends to give special weight to utopian considerations. But that is not what is asked of them. It is simply that they are less effective than they might be because they do not emphasize to the employers the fact that industry is in flux; that there is no immediate possibility of "peace"; that efforts to ameliorate conditions will, generally speaking, serve only to make workers more self-assertive and collectively effective. That is of course no argument against such efforts. Quite the contrary. But there should be an attempt to have employers see the limits of the benefits to them of any methods which they initiate and to forewarn them against a disappointment which might turn them—as it has already turned scores of employers—against the whole humanizing tendency of the times, simply because they have been cherishing a mistaken notion about the workers' "gratitude," "loyalty" and "cooperation."

In short, those who advise employers must in common honesty make explicit the truth that measures from above, whether conceived in generosity or justice, will not stand permanently as substitutes for the things which the workers come to desire on their own initiative. The task of management remains, but not as a work of conciliation. It is rather an effort at leadership toward a reconstruction which interprets and applies truly to industry the facts about the structure and nature of human beings.

The science of human management promises, therefore, to gain in its refinements whatever decisions we come to about the ownership, control or structure of industry. So long as there are human contacts to be made harmonious and cordial in the factory, there will be the chance for a truly human technique of industrial relations. But just because this is so, because this science has become possible with its broad outlines already in view, we must proceed slowly. For only as advances are made on the hypothesis of a dynamic industrial organization will results be valid because based on sound psychology. We shall only delay the formulation of right principles and methods if we allow a pseudo-scientific approach to labor problems to be used by employers as a stop-gap to discontent.

It is at once the strength and the weakness of these books that they make a beginning at formulating right procedure without completely safeguarding themselves from the accusation of putting a weapon of further autocratic manipulation into the hands of management.

O. T.

A Freudian Lyricist

The Lyrical Poems of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, translated by Charles Wharton Stork. New Haven: Yale University Press. $1.25.

MR. STORK'S translation of Hugo von Hofmannsthal's lyrics throw a further if sometimes confused light on this poet as he has appeared to English readers. Von Hofmannsthal's plays have already found a small but interested audience outside of Germany. Versions of his Der Tor und der Tod (The Fool and Death) and Die Hochzeit der Sobeide (The Marriage of Zobeide) have been printed in America; operagoers know him as the author of the Cavalier of the Rose and Electra, both of which have been put to music by Richard Strauss. From these dramatic works a fairly distinctive personality emerges; a nervous, intense and introverted talent. His "modern" recastings of the Greek classics show a mind that is both pathological and pedantic. It was undoubtedly his versions of Electra and Oedipus that made Rolland draw the portrait of Stephan von Hellmuth in the fourth book of Jean-Christophe;

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Therefore, —o would be **Me.**

Now continue the **E** across the **M,** so as to add **D**—thus / and you will have **Med.** Now add the **large** circle **O** and you will have / (*medo*), which is **meadow,** with the silent **A** and **W** omitted.

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Hellmuth, whose incredible Graeco-German tragedies were a "compound of Ibsen, Homer and Oscar Wilde—and a few manuals of archaeology." Never Greek at all, except in their borrowed outlines; they were a parade of pretentious and neurasthentic characters that are related far less to the spirit of Sophocles than to the studies of Dr. Freud; their mixture of impotence and intensity is a rich mine for the psychoanalyst.

The same characteristics, in a more restricted field, are true of von Hofmannsthal's lyrical poems. The sense of frustration and defeat, of discomfort in the presence of ordinary things, of a retreat into equivocal mysticism, is the outstanding feature of his verse. It is, like so much contemporary work, the art of evasion, of an inability to meet life frankly on its own harsh and uneven terms. Mr. Stork in his introduction only half agrees with Professor Grumann's objection that von Hofmannsthal's lyrics are "pervaded by an atmosphere acquired by idling in art museums rather than in immediate contact with life." Yet Mr. Stork himself, conceding that von Hofmannsthal's interest in "a given idea, scene or personality is only for the purpose of arriving at some philosophical conclusion," states with a fine ambiguity, "He does not wish human emotion to disturb him in his attempt to contemplate reality," and concludes this confusing line of thought by fatuously adding "In The Two he symbolizes admirably the mysterious relation of sex to sex, but we who read instead of being stirred to a poignant feeling of pity, are only impelled to murmur: 'How strange is truth!'"

Mr. Stork does not make matters clearer by his translations, which seldom rise above a workmanlike level. At the Outward Life is an awkward piece of terza rima, World Secret is an almost unintelligible attempt at profundity, and Life-Song has thirty-two lines of such "elusive suggestiveness" as:

> Oh peacock, lamb and eagle,
> His youthful lordship brave
> May waste the ointment regal
> An old dead woman gave.
> The dead, whose flight upstreameth
> And o'er the tree-tops gleameth—
> Naught more are these, he deemeth,
> Than dancers' robes that wave.

"Under the spell of Hofmannsthal," declared the translator, "one feels as when listening to the Andante of a mighty symphony written in a minor key." Especially, he might have added, when the woodwinds are missing and the muted violins are a full tone off the pitch.

L. U.

Contributors

to this Issue

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2ND LIEUT. MARC. P. DOWDELL—An officer of Company G, 38th Infantry, A. E. F., France.

H. N. BRAILSFORD—An English publicist, author of The War of Steel and Gold and A League of Nations. Fought in the Greek Foreign Legion in 1897. Was British Relief Agent in Macedonia in 1903-4 and a member of the Carnegie Commission in the Balkans in 1913, besides doing much work in Turkey and the Balkans as a newspaper correspondent, usually for the Manchester Guardian.

H. G. WELLS.



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WHERE YOU WILL REGISTER: In the customary voting precincts in the jurisdiction of your Local Selective Service or at other points to be designated.

SICK AND NON-RESIDENT REGISTRANTS: These will be furnished cards by their Local Boards. The sick will be registered by persons deputized to do so. Non-residents may register by mail through the County or City Clerk of the place at which they are stopping. Special provision will be made for felons, persons awaiting trial and others confined in jails or institutions.

The Government of the United States asks your hearty co-operation with your Local Board in making the registration a complete 100% catalogue of every man of the ages to be announced in the President's Proclamation. Selection will take place later by the usual Classification method.

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WATCH FOR REGISTRATION DAY!

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